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Abstract
This thesis attempts to.examine and explain the limi-
tations of the outcomes of advocacy planning and to
suggest ways through which these limitations can be
overcome.
I examine the origins of, and describe advocacy as
part of the 'community participation' movement, and as a
particular manifestation of a professional movement
disenchanted with traditional roles and concerned with
bringing about social change and with redistributing
equitably the resources in the city.
Further, I examine in detail the theory and practice
of advocacy planning, through the issues that it deals
with, its clients and constituen-ies, and its resources,
especially the use of technical knowledge. I argue
that it has adopted, explicitly or implicity, the
pluralist assumptions on the nature of our institutions
and the action that is needed to change them.
These assumptions are analyzed and criticized in
detail and are found inadequate as a basis for action
to achieve social change. The limitations of the outcomes
of advocacy projects are then explained by the adherence
of advocacy to pluralist principles. I suggest an
alternative analysis on which advocacy can base its
practice to overcome its present limitations.
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5CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The subject of investigation of this thesis, and the
method of investigation, stem from a particular desire. In
choosing to discuss the advocacy planning movement I am not
driven by purely academic interests, issues of strategy and of
methodology. I am not interested in evaluating a particular
mode of action in .its own terms, or in suggesting ways to ren-
der it more efficient. I must admit from the outset that my
interest, which is both academic and personal, lies in the
desire to achieve social and economic equality, responsiveness
of the social institutions, and a "better life". General as
it is, this last concern achieves such a clarity and concrete-
ness in the experience of our everyday life that any further
definition is unnecessary for the purpose of this paper.
I have chosen to discuss the issue of advocacy planning
because it, more than any other movement in the profession,
explicitly attempts to confront the problem of inequality,
quality of environment, and responsiveness of institutions
directly. It has also been a movement that has established
itself successfully and has served as a mode of action for
many professionals in planning, who advocate social change
as a means to achieve social justice.
Advocacy planning originated as a movement in the early
sixties in response to professional and popular dissatisfaction
6with traditional models of planning and their inability to
cope with the growing problems of the cities. Advocacy, as I
shall argue subsequently, adopted to a large extent, the plur-
alist model of social change, providing deprived interest
groups with the resources needed (particularly technical
resources) to compete in an assumed democratic process for
the satisfaction of their interests and their improvement.
There are many angles from which one can approach the
topic of pluralism and advocacy planning. Each one, to be
comprehensive and exhaustive, would require the work of a
dissertation in itself. Many papers have been written on this
relatively new mode of professional practice, critical and
complimentary. Most of this literature, however, deals with
operational issues of the practice, attempting to define models
of possible action and evaluate their effectiveness in dealing
with concretely defined problems. Often this literature deals
only with the methodological and operational problems of such
an evaluation. Few studies, such as those of Frances Piven,
have been written from a position removed from the immediacy
and the detail of the problems that advocacy encounters in its
practice and have attempted to present a total picture and a
critique of advocacy. Such studies have stimulated heated
and constructive and illuminating debate on both the actual
function and the future of the practise. The present paper,
at the risk of being too general, falls in this last category,
and follows, hopefully not in a presumptuous manner, the
reasoning of C. Wright Mills:
I can take a small portion of
this very large topic and try to
prove something about it in some
detail; or I can take the whole
topic and try to be merely prov-
ocative. I choose the latter.
For one thing it is more fun;
and for another, we ought to
try to reason together.
My interest, therefore, is in evaluating the efficacy
of advocacy planning as a possible model for the professional
planner to affect social change. In order to do this, a theory
is needed which will tell us what the nature of our social
institutions is, and what is needed to change them. Although
such a theory is not often made explicit, it is not absent
from advocacy planning literature. Paul Davidoff, the first
planner to formulate the model, related explicitly advocacy
to pluralist theory. It may be argued here that advocacy
planning is a myth; that it does not really exist as a coherent
mode of professional practice, with its own structure and
rules; and that whatever this practice is, it has no consist-
ent explicit connection with pluralist theory. Rather, ad-
vocacy planning can be seen as a convenient name which can
only describe the general mood of a period: a professional
dissatisfaction with traditional modes of practice, an eager-
ness carried over from Civil Rights organizing to get directly
involved with communities, an attempt to make planning more
8political, a direct concern with problems of maldistribution
and evnironmental quality. These concerns expressed them-
selves in a very moderate form, or in a very radical form
and, conveniently, they were called "advocacy planning". But
it is precisely for this reason that I am interested in advoc-
acy planning. In its most general form it is a movement which
carries with it certain values, is critical of certain condit-
ions, and its concern is to achieve social change. The basic
question that this paper asks is "how can such a movement be
effective in its goals?". Advocacy planning has exhibited
many inadequacies in pursuing its objectives.
I will attempt to show that much of the ineffectiveness
of advocacy action can be explained by its adherence to a
pluralist theory of social change, that is, by accepting the
pluralist assumptions of what it -takes to change our social
institutions. In the next chapter I will explain the inade-
quacies of pluralist theory in its function as a model for
achieving social change. Through this process, I am hoping
to show the points that a truly adequate theory of social
change has to account for.
In the third chapter I shall examine in greater detail
the social forces, briefly outlined above, that made the
general idea of advocacy planning acquire 'good currency'.
Through this, I can more clearly define the concerns and the
tasks of that movement. In the same chapter I will attempt to
9show the connection of advocacy planning with pluralist
theory. This I will do first, through an examination of
theoretical writing that explicitly attempts to place advocacy
planning on a pluralist basis;and secondthrough an examin-
ation of several issues in the practice of advocacy which, in
the way they are resolved in that practice, exhibit the plural-
ist biases and assumptions about what is needed to achieve
social change. This can lead to an understanding of the short-
comings of advocacy planning but more importantly, it is a
model that can give us an alternative for overcoming those
inadequacies. Through this criticism of advocacy I am hoping
that I can develop a new set of assumptions on the nature of
our social institutions which can serve as a guide for over-
coming the shortcomings of the practice. What will hopefully
emerge out of this process in the last chapter is a model on
which we can build a typology of advocacy planning action.
This typology will not be a result of a behavioral observation
and evaluation based on statistical measure of the outcomes of
such models, but rather it will be achieved through acquiring
an insight irto the nature of those problems that advocacy
planning is facing, and the corresponding decision mechanisms
that are needed or that must be altered for such a change
to occur.
This does not mean that in the final chapter of this
paper one will find a concrete model of advocacy which can be
10
applied successfully to our social ills. Far from it. The
intention rather is to attempt to describe more clearly the
tasks ahead and the structural changes that must be overcome
for advocacy planning to achieve its objectives.
The Uses of Social Theory
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer the
question: "Is pluralism proper for the creation and mainte-
nance of a decent society?" To the extent that we are inter-
ested in pluralism in terms of its implications for social
change we must judge it in terms of its effectiveness rather
than in terms of its accuracy of description. If pluralism
does not represent reality it is not necessarily rejectable
or objectionable if the strategies and institutions that it
prescribes would indeed lead to a desirable society. The,
fact, for example, that in American society, power is highly
concentrated while pluralism prescribes competing interest
groups is not necessarily or prima facie a point against
pluralism. In discussing social change, therefore, pluralism
stands on its capacity to implement itself and not on whether
it is implemented in actuality. Pluralism, as most social
theories, is an attempt to describe and explain reality.
But as long as it also serves as a model of action, as a
11
means to achieving social change and 4 decent society, then
we are interested in those aspects of it which are relevant
to the use to which the theory is put. Whatever logic a cer-
2
tain social theory has it has a logic-in-use , that is it has
a function in terms of what use it is put to. For example,
an assertion such as that "American society is ruled by the
democratic and decentralized mediation of competing interests"
can be verified by its correspondence to social phenomena.
Such an assertion also serves as a basis for justifying social
action. If for example pluralism prescribes such a model of
democratically competing interests for the achievement of
a decent society and at the same time identifies this model
in present reality, then the theory will be used to support
and strengthen this reality. As long as the prescribed instit-
utions do not lead to the desirable goals, this suggests not
only that pluralism is inadequate, brut also that the existing
social institutions are inadequate, and that therefore, plur-
alism in its logic-in-use acquires a function which is detri-
mental to the establishment of a decent society.
The Prescriptive Aspect of Pluralism and Advocacy
Most social philosophies have an ideological content.
They are prescriptions or justifications for certain kinds
of social action, policy, or way of achieving certain goals.
12
In this ideological sense they appeal, to the values that they
project.
For example, the value or intent of classical liberalism
as a way of describing reality can be contested. But not its
function as an ideology, as a way of guiding action. It asserts
that the unregulated pursuit by each individual of his own
self-interest - the maximization of his utility - is a desirable
social goal. The sanctity and freedom of the individual,
social, political and economic, is a moral prerequisite, a
goal of industrial socity.
Similarly, advocacy planning is not just a strategy for
achieving social equality for disaffected groups, -but it also
projects itself as a desirable goal as a model of a decent
society. Each social philosophy in its logic-in-use exhibits
3
the problem of the griffin hunt. Whether such a beast actu-
ally exists or not in social reality is immaterial to the
evaluation of the theory in its prescriptive function.
Although, as we have said, a theory of social action should
be investigated in terms of its logic-in-use, I shall make a
few remarks in this introduction, however incomplete, about the
prescriptive value of advocacy planning. The goodness and
desirability of the prescriptive aspect of a theory constitutes
a social force in itself, in its capacity to persuade practit-
ioners (in our use planners and architects) and the public to
adopt it on those grounds. Thus, Paul Davidoff claims that
13
the recommendation, that city planners
represent and plead the plans of
many interest groups is founded upon
the need to establish an effective urban
democracy, one in -which citizens may
be able to play an active role in the
process if deciding public policy.
Appropriate policy in a democracy
is determined through a process of
political debate.
The prescriptive aspect of advocacy planning displays
the quality of being consistent with its use as a strategy,
or a means, for achieving itself. That is, there is a con-
sistency between means and ends. This quality is not unique.
It is a prerequisite general characteristic of theories that
attempt to justify either our existing order or a certain soc-
ial policy or action. As we have said, such theories that
deal with problems -of decision-making are answerable to qual-
itative or value judgments. In attempting therefore to des-
cribe and to justify a particular mechnism of decision-
making they must seek to compromise the result of this analysis
with the values and the normative aspects of their content.
The evaluation and selection of facts results in a political
commitment. S. M. Lipset, for example, suggests that:
Democracy (i.e. the parliamentary
democracies of the West) is not only
or even primarily a means through
which different groups can attain
their ends or seek the good society;
it is the ood society itself in
operation.)
It is very important to understand the distinction be-
tween the prescriptive value of a theory and its use as a
14
strategy for change. In the first case the theory has a
utopian value whose appeal is based on its normative char-
acteristics. Once this theory acquires a logic-in-use, i.e.,
identifies with a certain set of social institutions, its
utopian value is completely transformed and acceptance of
the theory as a basis for action cannot be justified anymore
on its intrinsic prescriptive values.
Is the ideal model, prescribed by advocacy planning
possible or desirable? In its prescriptive function the
concept of pluralism in planning has attracted radicals and
conservatives alike. Radicals particularly have been attracted
to the concept of advocacy planning not only because they
saw in it a possible means to social change (and perhaps
the only possible one for professional planners and architects)
but also because of the value it represents as a possible model
to reorganize society. The appeal that it has for both radicals
and conservatives is as a projection of a model of an ideal
society. Advocacy planning is a viable alternative to the
bureaucratic expansion of the Welfare State. It is the ideal
of interest groups representing different interests, life
styles, and cultures living together in harmony and tolerance
with each other with adequate means and power ("resources")
to control the decisions that affect them. Thus pluralism in
its ideal form prescribes a model for a democratic distribution
of power and satisfaction of interests. Posed as an ideal it
15
answers the demand for community control, The de.fense of
the sanctity of the individual against a repressive state, ex-
pressed by classical liberalism and John Stuart Miil, is thus
central to the pluralist thesis, but here, individual interest
6
and autonomy is replaced by the group.
There are several technical and substantive arguments
against this model of group democracy. One of the technical
7
criticisms is expressed by Mancur Olson. Olson develops and
applies an "economic analysis" to the nature of aggregate
choice and concludes that interest groups do not best represent
the interests of their members. "Rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common 'group int-
erests'", Olson argues.
(The view that) groups tend to
further their interests is unjust-
ified, at least when it is based, as
it usually is, on the assumption
that groups act in their self-int-
erest because individuals do...
Unless the number of individuals
in a group is quite small, or un-
less there is coercion...to make in-
dividuals act in their common interest.
rational, self-interested individuals
will not act to ach eve their common
or group interests.
Another technical criticism was developed as a "law",8
"the Iron law of oligarchy," by Robert Michels who argues
that in any group, its leaders do not act in the interests of
their constituency. Thus, a group will not function properly
to the extent that it relegates and entrusts its interests
to its leaders.
16
A third, substantive criticism argues thats a) the
public is not properly socialized to make rational or 'good'
decisions (as e.g. the Southern whites making decisions on
race relations); and b) and most importantly, there is a con-
flict of interest among various groups, or between groups and
the "public interest" which must be mediated on a centralized
level (e.g., the State). "Is a neighborhood group to be
allowed to veto a city plan which takes into account the
9
needs of a wider and more inclusive social unit?" In this
last. criticism the question is reduced t the pragmatic, as
well as the philosophical or moral consideration of "who
should make, and at what levels of government, what kinds of
10
decisions, for how large a social unit."
This point bears further discussion. Many critics of
11
advocacy planning and pluralism have objected to the practice
by arguing from a position of principle (prescriptive) that
community groups do not have the capacity, or the interest, to
develop plans that are compatible with the "public interest".
The authority to make such decisions should be relegated to a
group which is above local interests, an elite, which has the
capacity, the knowledge, and therefore the moral right to
make such decisions. Essentially, this position recognizes
that a problem exists. Community groups are alienated from
the decisions that affect them. This alienation however is
viewed as a necessary evil; it is a sacrifice in the name of
17
efficiency and the goals that society pursues: i.e. the growth
in material output.
The argument is that decisions are being made under the
constraint of relative scarcity. It is an argument common to
both vulgar Marxism and neoclassical economics, based on the
economic or technological determinism of social relations.
In this view the public interest is associated with the pur-
suit of the objective of increased productivity and material
wealth. All social relations are essential to that objective.
In this view, then, alienation is a result of technological
requirements and therefore demands for community control and
advocacy planning are incompatible with the task of technol-
ogical and industrial development.
Urban renewal projects, highway controversies, such as
the Inner Belt in Boston, are all cases that demonstrate this
point. (See Chapter 3). This last case, the Inner Belt,
provides an extreme but illuminating example. M.I.T., in
rejecting a proposed route along its campus, argued that the
public interest and national security would be jeopardized by
such a route:
Laboratories and research facilities
which this so-called recommended
route will destroy constitute a
primary scientific arsenal of dem-
ocracy in this gruelling struggle
to maintain the balance of scient-
ific power in the service of free man
(who is threatened)...by those
Communist powers that seek to crush us
by moving a ad of us in scientific
techniques.
18
Such cases demonstrate quite clearly that the term "public
interest" is ideological and not objective. That is, its logic-
in-use reveals that it serves the interests of a particular
segment of society rather than the general public.
Cases such as the Inner Belt are numerous. But they are
not exhaustive. It could still be argued that on some level,
alienation is necessary and that although some decisions are
political still the hierarchical division of labor in society
is necessary for its efficient reproduction and growth. This
argument must be demystified.
Neoclassical economists, anthropologists, and other social
scientists, to a large extent accept the materialist motivation
of society as given, or natural. They subscribe to the formal-
ist argument that states that in any society conditions of
choice in a scarcity situation prevail and thus, efficiency,
Pareto-optimality, even though they may be hidden, define the
basis on which society is organized. Thus the process of
constrained maximization is seen as a universal, a natural
process. As Karl Polanyi, an opponent of this myth, states:
As regards man we were made to
accept the heresy that his motives
can be described as 'material'
and *ideal', and that the incent-
ives on which everyday life is
organized spring from the 'material'
motives. Both utilitarian liberal-
ism and popular Marxism favored
such views. As regards society,
the kindred doctrine was propounded
that its institutions were 'deter-
mined' by the economic system...
19
Under a market-economy both
assertions were, of course,
true. But only under such
an economy. In regard to the
past, such a view was no more
than an anachronism. In re-
gard to the future, it was a
mere prejudice.13
Accepting therefore the material interest as the natural,
universal public interest, and consequently the social organ-
ization of a materialist order as natural or as a necessary
evil is at least questionable. Further, the notion that even
a market economy as we have known it - i.e. Western industrial
society - is organized under the principle of efficiency and
that therefore hierarchical and alienating organization is in-
evitable because it is essential to a high material standard
of living, is also highly questionable.
14
Stephen Marglin, in a historical study claims that in
the course of the development of capitalism hierarchical organ-
ization and
depriving the workers of con-
trol of product and process
through (1) the development
of the minute division of
labor that characterized the
putting-out system and (2)
the development of the central-
ized organization that charac-
terizes the factory-system,
took place primarily (not)
for reasons of technical sup-
eriority...(but) for guaran-
teeing to the entrepreneur
the control of the producti*
process and of accumulation
20
If this is true then it becomes at least an open question.
whether or not the hierarchical order of decision making and
alienated communities are essential to a high material standard
of living. Other studies and experiments with alternative
models of industrial organization have also indicated that
increased productivity has little to do with the hierarchical
division of labor and that organization on the basis of cooper-
16
ative decision-making increases the productivity.
Nevertheless technical decisions do exist. A society
has to make such decisions relative to the goals that it has
17
set for itself - such as overcoming scarcity. Such decisions
are not value-free. They have implications for the people who
are affected by them. The problem is how to structure such
decisions to ensure that they remain technical and theyare
not used to impose the domination of one group over another,
and further, so that people participate in the solution of a
technical problem by which their own life is affected. If the
problem is defined in this way, democracy vs. alienation becomes
one of the values that a decision must maximize along with the
one on economic growth.
A few societies have begun to deal with this problem of
the planners and the planned. Examples can be drawn from the
Israeli kibbutz where management rotates; the Chinese exper-
iments in industrial organization under the Cultural Revolution,
where techinicians and management worked also as workers; or
21
from the proposals of Italian technicians and labor unions
where labor and the technostructure make decisions collect-
18
ively.
In this respect, advocacy planning makes an important
contribution to this problem. It argues - as opposed to
traditional pluralist theory which shelves the issue of tech-
nical decisions as part of the political process with no intrin-
sic qualities of its own (See Chapter 3) - that interest groups
should present their own plans reflecting their own interests
in a technical situation. The role of the planner is seen as
both an educator and an advocate of group interests. This
process is recommended in its practice particularly for
"community" groups but it could be seen as a viable model for
organizing all decisions including those in the production
process.
In its idealized form, then, advocacy planning appears as
a viable model for organizing socity.
But, as I shall aruge in the following chapters, by
identifying itself with existing political institutions and
structures of decisions, it abandons the utopian and prescrip-
tive appeal that it has. It becomes a strategy whose logic
and efficacy can only be determined by the use to which the
theory is put and the assumptions that it makes on the
existing political process that it identifies with.
22
CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEXT OF PLURALISM
In this section I shall present a model for decision-
making that can serve as an adequate basis for evaluating the
efficacy and the assumptions of pluralist theory and advocacy,
and for a discussion of alternatives.
The objects of concern of a social theory are decisions.
Such theories attempt to trace existing conditions to the cor-
responding decision-making processes. They evaluate and pro-
pose alternative processes (structures of decisions) compatible
- in structure and results - with the normative goals- set forth
by that theory.
I shall assert that there are two kinds of decisions that
shape our environment: institutionalized and political. The
distinction is my own formulation of a distinction that is
recognized throughout the planning and political theory lit-
erature under varying terminology. It is central to the deter-
1
mination of action that a theory recommends.
2
Robert Wolff in his critique of pluralism distinguishes
between the state of affairs or the events that are an object
of one's (or a society's) decision and those that are not, or
are consequences of one's decision but not (yet) objects of
decision in themselves. Through this distinction Wolff
defines "the law of the progress of rationality" as being the
transformation into objects of decisions of matters which prev-
23
iously were not such objects. "Once any feature of the social
world is known to be within human control, it is irrevocably
an object of decision, so that even the failure to act with
3
regard to it becomes a deliberate decision."
Thus, according to Wolff, the "unintended consequence"
- a major object of research by economists ard social theorists -
could be illustrated by the following example. Motorists make
an individual decision to use their car to go in and out of
town for work, entertainment, etc . The consequence of thous-
ands of such individual decisions could be a traffic jam. The
traffic jam itself is not an object of anyone's decision, it
is in fact despised by all.
Further, Wolff distinguishes between "matters of little or
no social importance and matters of major social importance."
He claims that "the daily actions of an ordinary citizen are
not, save under the most unusual circumstance, matters of major
social importance, but the actions of the president are."
This is an arbitrary assertion. The example of the traffic
jam itself shows that certain actions of individual citizens,
taken collectively, are of major importance and determine -
unintentionally - the environment.
The collectivity of such 'ordinary' actions I shall de-
fine as institutionalized decision processes. Such decisions
are impersonal; they are not actually taken consciously. They
are the result of our everyday life. They have to do with
24
income distribution, location of economic activity, the
structure and development of communities, prices and wages,
etc. They are the result of processes that have been instit-
utionalized in our society and are therefore part of our immed-
iate daily activity. Such processes in our society are economic,
but not exclusively so. Specifically one could identify the
following institutions:
- The private ownership and control of resources (land,
labor and capital) and a free market through which the use
and allocation of resources is regulated
The privatization of consumption, so that essential
or collective needs can only be satisfied through individual
consumption of commodities; and
- The centralized control of the productive process by
a bureaucracy or a management which r epresents the interests
4,5
of capital.
Going back to the example of the traffic jam we can say
that although each individual motorist makes a rational de-
cision to use his car for a particular task, this decision
is not made in a vacuum or a situation of maximum choice but
it is to a large extent dictated by the availability or not
of public transport, by the land use pattern of metropolitan
areas, the optimum location of economic activities, the struc-
ture of neighborhoods, inconvenience in choosing one mode of
transport over another, etc. We accept the institutional
25
constraints as natural, as given; we act rationally on that
basis even if the collective result of such actions leads to
irrationalities. In this sense therefore the daily actions of
an ordinary citizen to the degree that they comply to the de-
mands and requirements of major institutional and economic
mechanisms through which society reproduces itself, are matters
of major, perhaps the greatest, social importance.
The second type of decisions is political. These are the
decisions we are directly confronted with, such as the war in
Vietnam, adequate housing, minimum wage and welfare legislation,
taxation, the determination of the supply of public goods,
the transportation crisis, etc. In the Wolff model therefore
political decisions are identical to the "events that are ob-
jects of one's - or a society's - decision". Such decisions
are integrated into two basic processess the legislative,
and the administrative. The latter would include the city
administration as well as the management of a corporation.
Political decisions, that is decisions that result from pol-
itical processes, are what we directly experience and therefore
require our direct mediation. They require the explicit
formulation of goals and strategies and resource allocations
to achieve them.
Classical liberalism was of course the first political
theory to identify the process of institutionalized decisions
and to adopt it as a model around which a perfect society
26
should be organized. Adam Smith, for example claims that
when the enterpreneur - the average citizen
intends only his own gain...
he is...led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention...
By pursuing his own interest
he frequently promotes that of
the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote
it ... The statesman, who should
attempt to direct private people
in what manner 1they ought to
employ their capitals, would
load himself with a most un-
necessary attention.6
The political theory of classical liberalism responded
to the ideological demands of the bourgeois revolution against
the old repressive orders of the state and the church which
were fetters to the productive forces contained in society.
Thus any attempt of controlling the system of laissez faire,
on imposing political, deliberate decisions on the economic,
institutionalized mechanism was seen as detrimental to society.
The "public good" would be taken care of automatically, through
the "invisible hand".
Modern pluralism originated in response to the develop-
ments of western industrial societies, such as the increased
role of the "Welfare State" in the regulation of the economy,
productivity and affluence, an apparent decrease in political
and ideological concerns, the emergence of the large corporation
and the bureaucratic trade unions, totalitarianism, and other
27
phenomena which made classical liberalism obsolete as a
description of reality, or as an ideology.
Interest Group Pluralism
Pluralism, both as a theory and as a phenomenon, is
particular to the United States due to the cultural, social
and ethnic diversity of its immigrants and the structure of
its government. Thus, apart from changes in the size and
industrial organization of the modern state which made
classical liberal democracy imperative there are certain
8
factors specific in the American experience which argue for
a pluralist explanation. A first factor is identified by
Alexis de Tocqueville: "as the United States was colonized
by men holding equal rank there is as yet no natural or perm-
anent disagreement between the interests of its different
9
inhabitants. Louis Hartz has developed this thesis further
and has argued that the absence of feudal institutions in
American has created both a relative equality of condition
and a fundamental homogeneity in terms of class distinctions.
There are no horizontal distinctions in American, which has
a middle-class character. Or as de Tocqueville put it
"though thare are rich men, the class of rich men does not
exist; for these rich individuals have no feelings or purposes,
no traditions or hopes in common; there are individuals, there-
28
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fore, but no definite class." Interests divide society
but not along class lines. Economic interest is only one in
a set that would include all the diverse interests produced
in a complex organization of industrialized society (farmers,
industrialists, exporters, tenants, landlords, etc.) This
view is reinforced by another factor particular to the U.S.t
the impact of the American consciousness of its religious,
ethnic and racial homogeneity, a factor which was also iden-
11
tified by de Tocqueville.
Ethnic and religious agglomerations developed in the big
cities which under the "melting pot" argument were seen as
stepping stones for new immigrants to adapt in American soc-
iety. These entities developed culturally and religiously
and entered the political structure of American government.
The interests of the members of such groups were represented
by their leaders in local political processes. This process
facilitated upward mobility and assimilation. Thus, both
leaders and constituency would move into the national cultures
the national politics, having to do with the greater public
good, and the middle-class affluence.
A final factor is the often identified tendency to "deal
12
with social problems by means of voluntary associations".
Groups with particular interests join together in private
associations and apply their resources to a variety of problems
which they face. Ethnic and other minority groups constitute
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examples of this. Political pressure groups and lobbies,
special interests such as religion, art, life-style, charity,
encompassing a large part of social activity have been organ-
ized on a voluntary basis. This has been reinforced by the
traditional absence of an all powerful state, and the diffusion
of power through a maze of state, city and local governments
(formerly autonomous), judicial and executive bodies, etc.
Power, therefore, such as this of the capitalist class, did
not manifest itself in the State but was diffused throughout
this system of government.
Although the above identified factors are present in U.S.
society, it is debatable to what degree they dominate the
decision-making process. In those however,pluralism owes its
origins and much of its present form.
A large part of the assumptions of pluralism are based
on a modern view-of "rational" society, originating from
Max Weber but developing and establishing itself in its modern
form,in the fifties mostly,by leftist intellectuals. This
view is best known as "the End of Ideology" thesis. It was
first advance in various meetings of the Congress for Cultural
13
Freedom and later endorsed and developed by Daniel Bell and
14
Seymour Martin Lipset. According to this thesis no more
ideological conflict threatens to upset the existing social
order. This view is based on a "technological determinism"
interpretation of western advanced industrial societies.
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First, affluence, and the great productivity of American
15
economy had solved "the major problem of economic structure."
Scarcity has been overcome. Society has the productive capacity
to solve economic problems and the causes the economic classes
to loose their ideological strength and their eagerness to
revolutionize the social order. Second, a new elite, the
"technostructure, has now taken the place of the old entre-
preneurial elite, in the management of large corporations.
Thus, Lipset says,
the fundamental political problems
of the industrial revolution have
been solved....This very triumph
of democratic social evolution in
the West ends domestic politics
for those intellectuals who must
have ideologies or utopias to 16
motivate them to social action.
Or, according to Daniel Bell, "in the mass consumption
economy all groups can easily acquire the outward badges of
17
status and erase the visible demarcations."
Changes in the structure of employment (service over
manufacturing), and in the use of knowledge, both qualitative
and quantitative have taken place. Technological knowledge
is employed at a much larger scale than in previous societies
in the making of decisions, and recent advances in theoretical
knowledge central to the most important decisions in our
society, to innovation and growth. Further, since the New
Deal, the State, facilitated by the War and the Cold War
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Ideology (a "mobilized society") has grown as a regulator of
the economy and has penetrated and taken over decisions that
were previously left to the market: "In Western Society",
Bell says,
The dominant system has been
property, guaranteed and safeguarded
by the legal order.... But over the
last 25 to 50 years the property
system has been breaking up...
and changed in two distinctive ways.
One, individual property has be-
come corporate, and property is
no longer controlled by owners but
by managers.
The second change is the emergence of a new type of property,
that which is controlled and dispensed by the State,. Thus,
according to this view, our economy is a "controlled economy".
In the next few decades, the
political arena will become more
decisive. If anything ... we have
become, for the first time, a
national society, in which <rucial
decisions, affecting all parts of
the society simultaneously are
made by the governm t rather than
through the market.
Thus modern liberalism claims the supremacy of political
decisions over what I have called the institutionalized ones,
and this signals the end of radical politics. Since the
economy has the capacity to solve problems, class and ideol-
ogical struggle do not threaten anymore the social order. A
general consensus about the rightness of the institutions
prevails. Within the political decision making process technical
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rationality is central and will soon dominate decision mechanisms.
Within this framework which characterizes Western democracies,
there is a consensus that each issue or problem that arises
can and must be settled on its own individual terms, within the
framework of a basically neutral "welfare state."
Beyond this framework, however, opinions diverge. Bell,
for example, although he recognizes the political nature of
certain decisions, ("do we want compensatory education for
19.
Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other students?" )
argues that ours is a "national society" in which decisions cut
across group interest boundaries and have a national effect.
Decisions therefore should be guided by "the public interest".
This is made possible through the quantitative and qualitative
changes and innovations in the methodology of social and hard
sciences. Hence his notion that "experts know best" and his
20l21
rejection of interest group theory on which pluralism is based.
Pluralism however places technical knowledge and the professional
reformer on a different basis.
Pluralism accepts the assumption that political decisions
are autonomous and have replaced institutionalized mechanisms.
It is not clear from the various writings whether this assumption
is based on an interpretation similar to that of modern
liberalism as I explained it above, i.e., a deterministic inter-
pretation of "post-industrial", post-scarcity" society; or
whether it is based on the claim that the particular nature
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and structure of American society and its institutions give
to the political sphere an autonomy over the economic sphere.
The major assertion, in any case, which I shall challenge
in due course is that political decisions have replaced instit-
utionalized ones.
In the pluralist model, modern
developments have brought about
a discontinuity between that
which is socioeconomic and that
which is political. Politics in
the pluralist model ceases to be
an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic
life. Politics becomes autonomous
as the number of autonomous and 22
competing social units multiplies.
Or, as Dahl and Lindblom put it: "'Socialism once stood for
equality; but income and inheritance taxation, social security
and other techniques of 'capitalist' reform have destroyed its
23
distinction."
In economic organization and reform,
the 'great issues' are no longer the
great issues, if they ever were. It
has become increasingly difficult for
thoughtful men to find meaningful
alternatives posed in the traditional
choices between socialism and capital-
ism, planning and the free market,
regulation and laissez faire, for
they find their actual choices neither
so simple nor as grand....At least
in the Western World, most people
neither can nor wish to experiment
with the whole pattern of socio-
economic organization (corresponding
to what I have called the institutional-
ized decision-making process) to
attain goals more easily won. If
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for example, taxation will
serve the purpose, why 'abolish
the wages system' to ameliorate
income inequality?2 4
There is therfore a one to one correspondence between
this basic assumption of pluralism and the "end of ideology"
thesis. But where the "end of ideology" thesis proposes a
model of technocratic elitism in which the technostructure
represents all interests in society and plans for the "public
interest", interest-group pluralism proposes a model of
"countervailing powers". It reverts back to the automatic
model of classical liberalism. But now groups have taken the
place of individuals. In the sense that pluralism rejects
technical decision-making as synonymous to the public interest,
it is antielitist. It demystifies "knowledge" and the techno-
structure. It recognizes that decisions are political, and
must be mediated in a democratic process. But,like modern
liberalism it avoids confronting directly the issue of values,
by claiming that the pluralist process, like the market, is
self-regulating.
Within this framework, the role of the state is ambigu-
ously treated. The "referee" theory asserts that "the role
of the central government is to lay down ground rules for con-
flict and competition among private associations and to employ
its power to make sure that no major interest in the nation
abuses its influence."2 5 The "vector-sum" theory sees the
Congress "as the focal point for the pressures exerted by
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interest groups" by employing various resources, political or
other. In either case the government is seen as central.
It ratifies settlements and adjustments adjudicated among cam-
peting groups and it ensures access of such groups to the web
of rules. Political power is widely distributed. Many groups
share control of the state.
Political Participation
A fundamental presumptionof pluralists according to Polsby
is "that human behavior is governed in large by inertia. This
notion leads pluralists to look upon overt activity as a more
valid indication of involvement in issues than mere reputations
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of leadership." Throughout his book, Dahl places emphasis on
a distinction that he makes between homo civicus and homo
politicus. These are innate personalifty characters, not in-
fluences by social, historical conditions. "Homo civicus is
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not b nature, a political animal". Thus there is no poss-
ibility of learning anything from political apathy since it is
treated as an innate human characteristic. However, in extreme
circumstances, the pluralists would admit, homo civicus is
awoken from his political apathy. This would occur when "civic"
life is threatened by the "actions or inactions of governments."
"But when the danger passes, homo civicus may usually be
counted on to revert to his normal preoccupations with non-
36
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political strategies for attaining his primary goals."
These potentially mobilizeable attitudes exercise an effective
stabilizing and restraining influence on the political system.
Since pluralism assumes that the exercise of power is an overt
activity, i.e., is observable, then political apathy is taken
to indicate consensus rather than a belief in the futility of
political activity.
Decisions are not hidden; they are directly observable.
Pluralism therefore makes a strong methodological point that
the question to be answered is not "who makes decisions?" but
"does anyone make decisions at all?" and this can be answered
through case studies of "important decisions". A failure to
make a decision by some group or by homo civicus is not seen
as a decision in itself. Truth is associated with what is
directly observable and quantifiable. This methodological
assumption is directly challenged by stratification theorists
such as C. Wright Mills, who claims that power is visible only
in crisis situations. Because of the general consensus that
prevails, a power elite does not need to assert its power
except when homo civicus is mobilized. A stratification theory
therefore would concentrate not on the process of decision-
making but on the existing distribution of potential sources
of influence such as wealth, institutional position, etc.
Conversely pluralism concentrates on the observation of the
behavior of the actors; it is a "process" approach.
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The Exercise of Power
To examine the distribution of power the pluralist re-
searcher will concentrate on the exercise of power and not on
its sources. As Polsby points out, to assume categorically
that power exists in a community, and to ask "who runs this
community?" instead of "Does anyone at all run this community?"
is "somewhat like asking "Have you stopped beating your wifo?"
in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness
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to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite".
For example, "if a man's major life work is banking, the
pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and
not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption
holds until the bankerts activities and participation indicate
30
otherwise."
The obvious weakness of this assumption is that we cannot
be sure that elements which are immeasurable or unobservable
are not of decisive importance. It cannot explain why key
issues have not been decided at all. Baratz and Bachrach
criticize this approach of pluralism and attempt to put the
stratification theory on an equal methodological basis with
pluralism by using the concept of "mobilization of bias".
This concept may not be objectively measurable but it is
central to a discussion of power distribution.
By "mobilization of bias" they mean, "the dominant
values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions
38
which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups,
31
relative to others". There is a chance therefore that some
person or group could limit the decision-making process to
"relatively safe and non-controversial matters" by influencing
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community values and political procedures which should not be
overlooked by the researcher.
Lowi makes a similar criticism of pluralist methodology
by pointing out that Dahl in his model of decision making
omits altogether one possible way of settlement of issues.
In the resolution of conflict Dahl mentions three alternatives:
deadlock, coercion, or peaceful adjustment. What is missing
according to Lowi is the alternative of "peaceful coercion
adjustment", a concept very similar to the "mobilization of
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bias." These methodological biases of pluralist theory
heavily prejudice both the selection and the results of their
case studies.
Dahl's own arguments seem to support Baratz's and Bachrach's
contention, He states that the pluralist process takes place
within a consensus which is characterized by a belief in
democratic institutions, and an assumption by most citizens
"that the American political system is consistent with the
democratic creed." This widespread adherence to the democratic
creed is produced and maintained, according to Dahl, "by a
variety of powerful social processes...(of which) probably
formal schooling is the most important. The more formal
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education an American has, the more democratic formulas he
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knows, expresses, and presumably believes". The correlation
of formal schooling with adherence to the democratic creed is
not only peculiar but dangerous. First, it is dangerous be-
cause reserving democratic feelings only for the educated is
a strongly ideological position which has no basis in fact.
Second, it is dangerous to Dahis own argument: Several studies
have shown that the function of primary and secondary school
education (and possibly higher education) is not the trans-
mission of cognitive knowledge but socialization to the require-
ments of institutional roles that a particular social organiz-
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ation has a demand for. Thus Dahl's statement would be cor-
rect if one replaced in it "democracy" with the particular re-
quirements of "American democracy" and gives further credence
to the Baratz-Bachrach argument.*
Further, the key political decisions that should be in-
vestigated in such case studies - however a pluralist chooses
to define these, - according to Dahl "should involve actual
disagreement in preferences among two or more groups. In short,
*Surprisingly, Dahl's view seems to be shared by Wolff who is a
radical critic of pluralism. He claims that stratification
theories are wrong and that the people do indeed have access
to political power. If the policies by which they are ruled
are evil - and he brings the example of the Vietnam war -
they were indeed carried out with the consent of the public,
which only proves that the public is "too stupid or too
vicious" to react. (Wolff, o. cit, pp. 111-114).
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the case of "indifference vs. preference should be ruled out."
Preference, according to Dahl, is given, It is not something
that can be manipulated and therefore it is outside the
boundaries of a pluralist analysis. A power elite in this
case would be a group whose preference prevailed regularly
in key issues under evidence of existing opposition to the
prevailing preference. The key issues which should be invest-
igated are -to be found in those matters that have been decided
by someone against considerable opposition. Absence of oppos-
ition is seen as consensus.
Critique of Pluralist Assumptions
The major methodological error of pluralism however lies
in its assumption that the important decisions are all made
within the political sphere which supneredes the socioeconomic
one. To use the very example of the banker that Polsby men-
tions, pluralism assumes that the banker's decisions should be
investigated not in his capacity as a banker but in his involve-
ment in overt political processes on key issues of the commun-
ity. "As if banking were not a series of manipulations of
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community decisions perforce!" There is a whole spectrum
of key decisions that are being made outside the political,
process. Wolff thus claims that "the great corporations reg-
ularly make decisions whose consequences are of the utmost
&
social importance. These decisions, furthermore, are not
subject to review by the general public, as are the decisions
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of elected or appointed officials." Not only are nonpolit-
ical decisions of major social significance but they are of
overriding importance. Such decisions, as I have already
mentioned, would affect the location of activities and the
availability of jobs, the level of incomes, prices, the avail-
ability of goods, the pollution of the environment, etc. Thus
a deliberate political process such as collective bargaining
is in itself constrained by the institutionalized decision
mechanisms. Wages can be negotiated but only within the limits
dictated by the economic system. These limits are not truly
placed by private decisions of large corporations, for example,
as Wolff claims. A large corporation, or the technostructure
which allegedly directs its policies is in itself restricted
by the demands of the institutions of competition, economic
growth, expansion of the market, in short, accumulation.
Even if one accepts then the possibility that corporate dec-
ision-making is in itself a political process subject to
public review or to the inherent goodness of technical
decisions-making, this does not necessarily mean that such
decisions will be compatible with the "public interest".
Management has the power to set prices but the power of their
decision is limited by the institutional context in which they
are made.
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The role of the Welfare State is similarly a limited one.
Thus, the economist J. E. Meade claims that whatever incomes
policy may be initiated by the State it is bound to be very
limited because of the constraints built into the economic in-
stitutions. A highly progressive taxation might solve problems
of maldistribution. This however would "be bound to affect
39
adversely incentives to work, save, innovate and take risks."
Although one may disagree with Meade's explicit correlation of
material incentives with efficiency (cf. Chapter I, above)
the basic assertion that institutionalized constraints limit
the reform power of the State has been developed in a wealth of
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literature.
It is interesting to note that the limitations of this
thesis are apparent even in Bell's argumentation. He argues
for example, as we quoted above: "Do we want compensatory educ-
ation for Negroes at the expense, say, of places for other
students When the number of positions is limited?" (my under-
line). But by whom are these positions limited? Certainly
not by a deliberate political process.
This is an argument that is overlooked by both pluralists,
who claim that no restructuring of institutions is needed since
demands can be satisfied by the existing pluralist process,
and stratification theorists, who claim that a power elite or
a ruling class controls the process and outcome of decision
making, but it is not absent from the planning literature.
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Roland L. Warren's remarks could serve as a summation of our
thesis:
most purposive change... is a
response to problems arising from
the unplanned aggregate of indiv-
idual decisions by persons, fam-
ilies, and organizations of one
type or. another as they pursue
their interests and objectives.
Such activity, in aggregate, is
perceived as pogulation increase or
decrease or redistribution, either
geographically or by sex-age cat-
egory; or as "suburban growth", or
"industrial growth" or "increasing
automation".-...Most of what is
called "planned social change"
is a relatively modest response to
these larger changes which are
taken as "given" and are not the
result of concerted, deliberate,
centralized decision-making.
Unemployment insurance is instig-
ated to meet the contingency
of unemployment, rather than prevent
it; city planning commissions take
adaptive measures in view of such
changes as population' decline in
the central city, suburban growth,
new industrial location patterns,
and the commuting phenomenon;
social services are developed to
help families whose individual lives
dramatize the results of some of
the larger changes.kl
Thus Warren introduces another point: Purposive social
change which is the object of politics and planning, in a
society that is governed by institutional decisions, is
always an afterthought. It deals with the consequences
rather than the causes of problems. What politics deals with
is not pursuit of explicit goals, but adequate compensation
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for new problems which a-e created by industrial growth under
the particular institutional organization of our society.
Gintis calls this the "alienation of the state political
apparatus" both historically and in recent developments.
Historically, "the primary decisions which govern social dev-
elopment are made in the economic sphere...the State has no
essential control over income distribution, work-activities,
the development of community or technology." Further,
in recent years, the state apparatus
has extended it s sphere of influence
even more directly into the economic
realm, both as a direct employer,
and as a dominant regulator of indus-
trial activity. Here again, however,
the state has no choice but to act a
an appendage to the economic system. 2
A final argument that should be nade is that the political
process is not only an appendage to economic institutions but
its primary function is as a corrective mechanism for the mal-
function of institutional mechanism and as a means for expansion
of the territory of economic activity. This argument challenges
the view that the state plays a subordinate but basically
neutral role. As Gintis claims, "the core institutions
simply do not operate properly in their 'pure form' and it is
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the function of the state to correct malfunctions."
Gintis gives the example of child labor laws and factory
safety legislation which were "important to the generation of
an adequate labor force" in the first steps of industrialization.
More recently, welfare programs, zoning, and highway programs
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can be analyzed as "perfectin; and stabilizing rather than
undermining the operation of core economic institutions."
Much has been written about the real purpose of governmental
reform and its function as a stabilizing and perfecting mech-
anism, some particularly relevant to the planning field.*
Theodore Lowi tabulates a number of selected public
policies, by degree of "likelihood of significant social
change" and "degree of government involvement." The results
are that public policies which exhibit a high degree of
government involvement and which call for significant social
change.ware quite infrequent. "This particular look at government,"
*Frances Piven and Richard Cloward in Regulating the Poor,
Pantheon, New York, 1971, investigate historically the function
of welfare programs. Robert Goodman in his recent After the
Planners, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972, documents tihe
loyalty of the government to business interests in their
attack on the urban crisis, the highway programs, work train-
ing programs, etc. Baran and Sweezy, op.cit.
develop the theme of the function of the state in the accum-
ulation process by its role in the absorption of surplus,
and the consequences that this entails for the urban condit-
ion. Barton J. Bernstein in his "The New Deal: The Conser-
vative Achievements of Liberal Reform" in Bernstein (ed):
Towards a New Past, Vintage, New York, 1969 documents just
that. For a documentation of the role of the U.S. Government
in the field of socialized housing see Michael Stone, "The
Political Economy of U.S. Housing" in Upstart, no. 3, Winter,
1971. For a general theory of the state cf. Ralph Miliband,
The State in Capitalist Soe Basic Books, New York, 1969
and Georges Poulantzas Pouvoir Politique et classes sociales
Maspero, Paris, 1969.
Lowi claims, "should be most unsettling to liberals and espec-
ially to Negro leaders, who, socialized by white liberals,
have assumed that political power is all that one needs in
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order to achieve important humanitarian goals."
Related to this view of the state is the question of
whether the economy has enough slack to allow for government
subsidization of solutions to public needs such as housing,
public transportation, elimination of slums; and unemployment;
or whether the government by satisfying public needs can also
satisfy the institutional requirements placed upon it. Much
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has been written on this subject. Sweden, South Africa, and
Great Britain, among other nations, have in varying degrees
provided successfully socialized services such as housing and
medicine. So it is argued that even though the state may be
a servant of powerful economic interests it can serve those
interests by satisfying public needs. Such a question cannot
be resolved one way or another in a general level. It must be
left open and reexamined in concrete situations.
The Logic-in-Use of Pluralism
The point that institutionalized decisions override
political ones must be further clarified: There are several
reasons why both political theorists and the general public
often adhere to the stratification model and the power elite
even though the (political) decisions of such an elite are
subordinate, as I have argued, to institutionalized constraints
- and, .therefore, even if the power elite had good intentions
it would be unable to implement its programs. As Wolff has
claimed the adherents to the power elite theory are wrong but
for the right reasons. That, is, they object to the results of
institutionalized decisions. But the only way that the very
structure of decision making can change and either be relegated
to the political sphere or to new, less objectionalbe instit-
utions, is through purposive action - that is, through politics.
Therefore, although politics in its present form is an appendage
to economic institutions, it is also "the midwife of history".
But if the current political practice claims for itself all
possible alternative for political action and refuses to
challenge the structure of institutions, this is taken in itself
to be a political decision and as Bachrach and Baratz have
argued (cf. above) it is part of what constitutes political
power.
Further, the political sphere (e.g., the Welfare State)
makes promises that cannot be kept. It claimes that social
problems can be solved through it. When it fails to do so the
expecting citizen will ask "why hasn't the state delivered
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the services that I rightfully demand?" This absence in the
improvement of the delivery of services then is seen as a
deliberate policy on the part of a power elite. But the
political process claims, that, in its present form, it covers
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the full range of alternatives, in order to preserve itself.
I have presented above a criticism of some assumptions
and biases of pluralist theory. These biases however are not
simply shortcomings or methodological errors of the theory.
They are ideological arguments, central to the theory and to
its logic-in-use.
Under this logic, pluralism discourages a certain kind
of politics in favor of the existing process. It serves an
integrative function, in placing all demands, claims, and
interests in a process that requires them to be rational and
to be resolved rationally.
This particular function of pluralism can be found in
many of its principles. In the particular emphasis that it
places on governmental decisions and political mechanisms of
deicions-making, to the exclusion of any consideration of
institutional mechanisms, it tends to prejudice the nature of
our problems and what is needed to solve them. It obscures
issues and divisions in society that are a direct result of
the functioning of economic institutions. Thus, this view
challenges the traditional Marxist approach to social conflict
as stemming from socioeconomic mechanisms do not govern
decisions anymore. Basic conflict, resulting fron the normal
reproductive function of institutional mechanisms, is not
recognized by the theory. What is recognized instead is
vertical divisions in society, a multitude of particular
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interests and sets of problems, seemingly unrelated to each
other. They cannot be predicted by a social theory to the
extent that this theory looks for their causes in the function
of socioeconomic institutions. But they can be predicted by
behavioral sciences to the extent that these sciences give
a psychoanalytic interpretation to social behavior.
This function of pluralism is reinforced by the views
held towards radical or mass movements, towards apathy and
48
tolerance and towards "rationality".
In the first place, the assumption that political decisions
override institutional ones whether because all major economic
problems have been solved or because the political sphere is
autonomous and can satisfy all demands andthat therefore no
moralistic or ideological conflict is valid, since all demands
canbe met through the existing system, discredits as irrational
radical movements which call for major structural changes, or
which present their demands outside the normal pluralist instit-
utions. If the general assumption is that our society has the
procedural and material capability to solve problems, than
obviously any failure to translate needs to specific demands
within the web of rules, and any attempt to radically re-
structure those rules, is seen as irrational and wrong. The
pluralist interpretation of apathy and non-participation as
consensus is brought as evidence that indeed this is the
general assumption shared by the public as a whole. Further,
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political apathy and non-involvement are seen as evidence that
the pluralist system works.
The pluralist assumption that a rational demand is one
that can be satisfied within the framework of the existing
social order further reinforces the conservative logic-in-use
of the thoery. It is argued that in a pluralist framework
rational demands can be satisfied. But rational according to
the theory is identified with the instrumental pursuit of one's
self-interest. Thus, if demands are to be satisfied they must
be presented instrumentally, translated into concrete goals
which can be satisfied. No rational group or individual would
pursue goals which could not be satisfied. Utopianism is
excluded through the definition of instrumentality. The case
of satisfaction of demands is thus predetermined. As Bell
argues, the danger "is that political debate moves from specific
interest clashes, in which issues can be identified and poss-
ibly compromised, to ideological tinged conflicts that polarize
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the groups and divide society."
The reliance of pluralism on groups as mediating mechan-
isms for the resolution of conflict is seen by Rogin and Wolff
as a function of the theory linked to the tradition of
Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. In this view, for the modern
pluralists
a constitutional regime requires
#traditions of civility' that
tolerate a variety of interests,
traditions, life-styles, religions,
political beliefs, and economic
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activities. This diversity is
safeguarded when ppwer is shared
among numerous groups and instit-
utions. Groups provide individuals
with specific channels for realizing
their demands, focusing their members
on the practical desires that can
be realiz in ordinary democratic
politics.
Pluralism assumes that groups are homogeneous, democratic
and are characterized by elite leadersiip. Leadership is
central to the pluralist thesis:
In any durable association of
more than a handful of individuals,
typically a relatively small pro-
portion of the people exercises
relatively great influence over
all the important choices bearing-
on the life of the association
....These persons are, by defin-
ition, the leaders.5 1
Leaders fall in the category of homo p ticus. Their power is
derived by a natural desire and reward from getting involved
into the political process. Although their power is unequal,
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it is "non-cumulative". This elite leadership is character-
ized by a democratic relationship to its constituency - the
homo civicus." Both the consensus on the "American democratic
creed" and the "ease with which the political stratum can be
penetrated whenever dissatisfaction builds up in some segment"
of the constituency act as incentives for the elite to be
representative of group interests and to be checked by their
5~3
members. But elites perform a much more vital function than
just representing group interest. In their turn, leaders
check members. They have the capacity to translate desires
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to rational demands, they are better informed than their
constituents; in sum "for the pluralists, leaders are more
likely to be socialized into the dominant values and established
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institutions of their society." Assuming that the pluralist
political process is slack, and has the capacity to solve all
problems presented to it then the role of the elite leadership
certainly seems to be a rational one. Community values can be
translated into operational and concrete technical and political
goals, into plans and "counterplans" mediated in a rational
process.
Demands that deal with direct democratic political control
of all major decisions that affect the quality or work, of
environment, of community, of material equality and satisfaction
cannot be dealt with in the pluralist system since that control
does not belong to the political sphere.
If the pluralist assumption that political decision
mechanisms have displaced institutionalized decisions and that
therefore all issues can be resolved within the political
process, is true, then rationality is a value equated with the
proper function of this political process. Discontented
people would be irrational if they did not play the rules.
The particular role of the elites and of the techno-
structure is important in this process. The elite is seen as
a group, properly socialized into the values of society, that
has the knowledge and the technical and political capacity to
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translate values, and "moralistic" goals.
This role is not conservative in itself. But, in the
light of other pluralist assumptions, it becomes the principal
mechanism of cooptation of values that are potentially detri-
mental to the pluralist order. Further, because of the central
position that it occupies in the pluralist model it is the
principal mechanism of integration and consensus. The import-
ance of this mechanism in American history - e.g. in the labor
union and civil rights movement - cannot be overemphasized.
The translation of values into concrete rational demands
is related to the pluralist assumption that the exercise of
power is observable, and to the consequenteemphasis on behav-
ioral observation and case studies. This implies that the
resolution of conflict in a particular controversy that may
have arisen, can come about-by treating the case in an isolated
manner. It preempts the possibility that concerted action is
needed on another level, that the problem is structural and
cannot be treated ahistorically. It reinforces the view
that ideology is obsolete and that all that is needed for an
adequate expression of the problem and for the manipulation of
political actions, the exercise of power, is technical knowledge.
In summary, pluralism, in its logic-in-use performs
several conservative functions. It reverts back to elitism,
it obscures the real nature of social problems and therefore
excludes certain types of action which is possibly necessary.
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It performs an integrating function and acts as a valve for
the legitimation of demands, issues, and groups and the ex-
clusion of others. The latter functions are not conservative
in themselves but they become so if they are used to preserve
political structures, and integrate groups within them, that
are incapable of satisfying demands made upon them.
CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXT AND EMERGENCE OF ADVOCACY
A number of factors contributed to the emergence of
advocacy planning in the early sixties. These include the
deteriorating quality of U.S. inner cities; the professional
disappointment with traditional forms of practice; the civil
rights movement, urban riots and unrest; the War on Poverty;
the professionalization of reform; the fiscal and bureaucratic
problems of city and federal administration. In order for
advocacy planning to be properly understood, a brief exposition
of these factors and of their interrelationships is in order.
The Context as a Consequence of Institutional Mechanisms
The crisis of the sixties was brought about by problems
that are consequences of institutional mechanisms of decision-
making. One of the major problems was migration to the cities
and the subsequent population explosion. Nineteenth century
European immigrants located close to the center of cities,
near industry and jobs. When they became better off they
moved out of the city while new migrants took their place in
a filtering process. There were always closed working class
quarters in cities but these were usually ethnic agglomerations
and not ghettos in the sense that they developed with the mid-
twentieth century migration of blacks from the South. The roots
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of the present crisis lie with the transformation of Southern
agriculture. Introduction of new technology eliminated the
sharecropping system and hand labor. Many of the displaced
blacks moved to the North. This process of migration was
facilitated by the jobs provided by the war industries in
the two wars, particularly World War II, and the expanded
production of consumer goods. The large migration of the
fifties however, was caused largely by the decisive trans-
formation of Southern agriculture, which resulted in a huge
decline in use of labor. The migrants of the sixties however
were faced with a different situation. Jobs were not readily
available to them both because of a slow-down in national
economic growth and their lack of skill - which during the
was was overcome by the cost-plus production. Further, in-
creased application of automation and the decentralization of
economic expansion and employment to the periphery of metro-
politan areas contributed to the problem. Segregated suburbs
kept blacks away from jobs. But this is not all. The tech-
nological contribution to the decentralization of cities, to
the structure of employment and to housing is a major factor
in the current crisis. Motor transportation and the spread
of automobile use made it possible for industries to locate
away from the central cities where more land is available at
a lower tax rate.
The better-off classes, pushed out by increased city
poverty, deteriorating quality of services and black migration
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followed a similar pattern. This was facilitated by various
government programs such as housing subsidies - V.A. and FHA
loans and FNMA subsidies - and federal highway programs.
As a result of this, human and material resources, educ-
ational, capital, and services, were drained from the inner
city. Absentee ownership of housing and the lack of upkeep
by owners who refuse to replace depreciation, thus withdrawing
their capital while still maintaining a steady income from
high rents, led to rapid physical deterioration, accentuated
by overcrowding conditions, caused both by lack of housing and
increase in population through a high birth rate among blacks
and a reduced mortality rate. The physical deterioration of
the inner city and the flight of industry and the middle class
in the suburbs precipitated the final crisis of the city which
was thus unable to deal with increased demands for services.
The deterioration and perpetuation of ghettos is explained
both by a circular causation argument and by a domestic colon-
ialism argument. According to the second argument, the ghetto
is "an area or a reserve of labor whose lower incomes are
1
somehow necessary to, and agreed upon by, white society.
According to the first argument the conditions of life
in a poor community tend to reinforce and preserve poverty
Low incomes are the result of low
productivity, which is promoted in
turn by poor diet and poor health..
low incomes mean crowded and unsan-
itary housing, which leads t? bad
health and low productivity.
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The same argument can be made about crime, credit, education,
and the culture of poverty. This last topic has been much
discussed. Social scientists such as Moynihan and Banfield
attribute the ghetto stagnation to cultural reasons such as
the lack of motivation and middle class aspirations, thus
rejecting economic factors. Others such as Liebow and
Silberman claim that ghetto residents
Precisely because they have
been acculturated into middle-
class values, their inability
to climb out'.of the lower class
slum persuades them that the
cards are stacked against them.
In any case ghetto poverty is accompanied by social and
cultural problems such as increased delinquency and crime rate,
breakup of families and an "irregular" ghetto economy.
Conditions as Results of Political Metchanisms
The attempts of federal and local governments to remedy
the situation only aggravated the problems. The legislature
through the Urban Program (Title I of Housing Act of 1949)
attempted to eliminate slums and halt the deterioration of the
inner city, to recapture the inner city for the middle class
and to increase the tax base. The implication of the act was
that the social conditions were a result of the physical
deterioration of the environment and that elimination of the
slums would consequently eliminate social problems. This
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assumption of causality was wrong and social scientists like
Herbert Gans, Lee Rainwater, Marc Fried, and Peggy Gleicher,
argued that the slum environment often has the opposite
function, i.e. to provide a basis for the residents to cope
and deal with the problems facing them.
Of course this assumption was not only erroneous but
it also served as a justification for the suburban interests
to recapture the inner city. Businesses that require face to
face contact, educational and governmental institutions never
lost interest in the inner city. Their claims for expansion
and upgrading were followed by sectors of the middle class who
were attracted by downtown institutional opportunities and
were harassed by increased commuting efforts. The only poss-
ibility of recapturing the lost territory was on a vast scale,
through eminent domain and with the use of federal funds that
4
Urban Renewal provided.
In practice urban renewal did what it was supposed to do.
It provided a way "of taking land from old users, and selling
it in large quantities to new ones, at a much lower price than
5
would otherwise prevail." The net effect has been to lower
the price of evicting the poor. Further, by reducing the
supply of low-income housing, it has caused rents to rise:
Criticism of urban renewal has
often been limited to its failure
to find vacant apartments for the
specific families evicted. But
even if the relocation agencies do
function for these individuals, the
net effe-t on low income families is
adverse.
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Thus, the Douglas Commission has shown that until 1967,
almost 400,000 mostly low-income housing units were demolished
in urban renewal areas while 107,000 units were built in their
7
place, a very small percentage of which was low income housing.
Thus the destruction of viable communities, the identif-
ication of the program with "Negro Removal" and the lag in
the provision of the promised low rent housing units - the
1949 act had promised 810,000 public-housing units in a six
year period - precipitated criticism of the program and contrib-
uted to the urban unrest.
The federal highways program7 which sought to remedy the
problem of. commuting by carving highways out of those same
inner city neighborhoodshelped to precipitate the crisis.
Such political responses to the crisis contributed to the
insight that the political institutions and their programs
were not there to help alleviate the problems but to serve
dominant interests and to contribute to the intensification
of the problem.
The crisis was accompanied by a breakdown of the plural-
ist process in the city. Traditionally, voluntary associations
were capable of dealing with the demands of their constituencies.
Civic, service and fraternal, and neighborhood associations
were functional in integrating, providing jobs, services and
information, patronage and protection for poor and ethnic
groups. But, as I mentioned above the new conditions of the
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inner city made this process obsolete and the poor felt
alienated from the existing political and cultural organi-
zation of the city.
The Professional Contradictions
In this context, the traditional modes of practice for
the professions of architecture and planning seemed incapable
of dealing with the crucial issues facing them. Every prof-
ession is built on an ethos that justifies its existence and
practice in terms of normative goals that it pursues, and on
a social function defined largely by the demands of institu-
tional decision mechanisms. The concerns of the architect
that are based on the ethos of the profession, in a sense, run
contrary to the demands that institutional mechanisms place on
the environment. If the former have to do with the quality
of the physical environment, the latter are concerned with the
efficiency of the allocation of resources and with private
ownership and control. Thus architecture was seen as irrele-
vant to the demands of the reproduction of economic institutions
and was pushed to the margins of productive activity. Less than
twenty per cent of the building activity of the country went
through an architect. The profession had to contend itself
with the "private concerns", as Mills called them: the concerns
of those rich enough to afford architectural services and to
employ the architect for their own interests. The primary
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function of the architect was that of the decorators "beautify-
ing the milieux of the rich and polishing up the face of the
8
corporation."
The professional action based on the ethos of architecture
of planning has the potential of becoming an independent force
and of challenging the institutional structure that constrains
it. Architects, and the AIA have always been aware of the
institutional constraints on the profession. The utopian
tradition - exemplified for example in the writings of Jane
Jacobs - has always been strong. Thus a report of an AIA
committee "On the Future of the Profession", published in the
9
AIA Journal admits that the "constraints - economic, political,
technological - are numerous, but if they can be minimized the
problems can be solved". But the AIA and the profession never
really attempted to understand the nature of those constraints
and the action that is needed to overcome them. Instead, it
called for the generation of "creative programs" and p;rtner-
ships with the "enlightened" developers. At other times the
AIAfinding itself having to protect both the ethos and the
shaky position of the architect in society attempted to abandon
any pretense of acting according to a professional ethos.
Perhaps the only realistic course
is to adopt a plan which depends
neither on custom nor conscience
but on human dignity alone. It
is the adoption of an unwritten
code which antedates the French
and American Revolutions, the
principle of noblesse oblige...
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Like noble breeding (architecture's)
inherent lineage presupposes a
deep moral obligation to preserve
its high standards; and its future
lies not in the architects' coll-
ective conscience but with the res-
pect in which architects hold themselves
and their colleagues.10
Whether the professional organizations are set up and
capable to pursue demands -springing from the professional ethos
is open to question. The AIA has attempted to enlarge the role
of the architect for the dual purpose of expanding the base
of a faltering professional activity and or appearing as
relevant to the problems of today. Eagerly and indiscriminately
the AIA adopted and encouraged new techniques and new roles:
from civic design to urban design, fallout shelters, systems
and methodology, participatory design and pollution ("visual
11
pollution is deadly too" ), even the student protest. It
supported and joined the governmental programs that were pres-
ented as solutions to the urban crisis. However, the state
often failed to reciprocate support:
Despite the stress on innovation,
however, HUD in the early days of
its Model Cities program failed to
call on the doers, including the
architects. Yet when it comes time
to implement plans, the doers are
turned to and the doers so2times
find the plans unworkable.
But in whatever program the architect did participate,,
such as in the Urban Renewal Projects, the performance of
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the programs did not enhance the professional ethos.*
Young and critical architects therefore found them-
selves in a precarious situation. On the one hand, trained
by elite schools to see themselves as having much control over
the environment, they found their role in society expendable.
Further, they discovered that the few jobs that awaited them
hardly presented them with any initiative in the design process,
but rather they were asked to serve as "workers" in a highly
structured hierarchical professional organization. On the
other hand, faced with the urban crisis and the damands that
powerless groups were making on professionals and reformers,
architects found that the traditional roles were subservient
to powerful interests.
Similarly in the planning profession, the limitations of
the traditional structure and preoccupations were a cause for
the search of alternatives.
As I have noted in the previous chapter, the role of the
technostructure and specifically of the planner is a peculiar one.
*In the last year the American Institute of Architects has
been instrumental in establishing Community Design Centers
throughout the country and in lobbying for the OEO Bill
(section: Community Design and Planning Assistance) curr-
ently before the Congress which will provide funding for
the involvement of architects in such centers. The Bill
"recognizes that persons living in urban and rural pov-
irty areas must have improved access to professional arch-
itectural, planning, engineering and related design ser-
vices in order to participate more effectively in the plan
ning and development of the physical environment of their
communities....The program. . .would make design and planning
services relating to housing, neighborhood facilities,
transportation and other aspects of community-based design
and planning organizations staffed primarily b professional
persons and community residents on a voluntary basis.=
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That technicians, ad."inistratorbs and planners have risen to
directing posts in the economy, political institutions, and
public authorities, and that the role of such institutions has
become more central in society, is true. But to what extent
they have been able to assert their autonomy in decisions and
to what extent technical decisions carry with them a new
"scientific morality", as Melvin Webber has suggested, is
at best arguable.
The traditional view of planning legitimized its practice
largely through the acceptance of the model of technical
decision-making exemplified by the end of ideology thesis.
Several views have been presented on the domain and- the prac-
tice of planning. Professionals have argued for disjointed
incrementalism (Lindblom) versus comprehensive planning
(Davidoff and Reiner), which is often used synonymously with
social planning, functional planning, process planning,
technical and authoritative planning etc. Within those often
conflicting definitions of the profession certain assumptions
are common.
If one takes planning to mean the purposive use and
allocation of resources - means - for achieving a certain
project - end - consistent with a set of explicit values then
there is very little or no planning activity to speak of in
this country. Comprehensive planning is the direct opposite
of institutionalized decision-making. As Stephen Cohen has
argued
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a(general resource allocation)
plan suggests that shaping the
future society passes from a
process of causation to a process
of decision. At present (in a
market system) the direction of
development is 'caused'; it is not
decided ... .Pragmatic (planning)
enters the causation process in
disjointed, piecemeal fashion
to temper and to stir it a bit.
But it does not substitute an
alternative process of deliberate
decision for the present process of
unplanned causation.14
A change, from causation to decision,
implies in substance (in incomes,
profits, prestige, freedom, power,
etc.) and (therefore) it is not
likely to happen without a prior,
enabling change in substance.15
The planning profession is thus facing a serious contra-
diction: the need to expand purposive action to encompass
all areas of human need, based on explicit goals, while its
action is seriously restricted by institutional constraints.
Under a social system where major decisions are dictated by
institutionalized mechanisms, the values inherent in the
process of planning cannot be made explicit and thus the
function of planning as purposive action is limited.
By this definition, planning is political and values
are central to it. But by operating under the cloak of
scientific objectivity planners have pushed aside the issue
of values and the institutional limitations of the profession.
Dissent in the planning profession therefore stems from
two related facts. First, there is a discrepancy between
the alleged power that a planner has to implement his technical
6?
decisions and the actual power he finds lacking in the per-
formance of his function. Second, technical and planning
decisions are not value-free but are directly political, and
the planner discovers that the practice based on scientific
objectivity has in fact been used in a biased way in the past.
The forces therefore which helped bring forward advocacy
planning as an alternative were: (a) The deteriorating condit-
ions, physical, e'conomic and social of the inner city. These
conditions, I have argued, were a result of, or were caused
by, the particular economic institutions that our society has
adopted; (b) the insight that political corrective mechanisms
were aggravating the situation; (c) the resulting sense of
alienation from political institutions and the consequent
protest movement and the plight of blacks and the poor, in
the cities and the South: and (d) the disillusionment with
traditional modes of practice both in their efficacy to
solve the problems at hand and, equally important, in the
satisfaction of professional values, and professional aspir-
ations in terms of the availability, and quality, and scope
of jobs.
These concerns were more or less common to most profess-
ions and underlined the unrest of the sixties. Traditional
practices and assumptions could not account for the new
concerns and realizations.
From this crisis in the professions, and from the exam-
ples set by other movements such as the Civil Rights Movement
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and the attempts to organize poor communities, such as
Alinskys, advocacy emerged as an alternative. This practice
became common in law, social services, psychiatry, medicine
and planning and architecture.
The Pluralist View of Advocacy Planning
Dissenting professionals and advocacy planners challenged
directly the nonpolitical position of the profession and saw
its limitations as a force for social change. Thus Davidoff
writes:
City planning in the United States
has reflected the culture of which
it is a part. It has been used to
support the economic growth and to
maintain the present distribution
of opportunities and of goods and
services. Because the present dis-
tribution of such things as wealth,
income, education, and health is
unequal, city planning has supported
the maintenance of such inequalities.
Zoning and urban renewal have been used
as a means of preserving the separation
of income classes and social groups.
Planning has been employed for the
purposes of maintaining segregated
housing and segregated schools.16
This has been the result of the uncritical and neutral stance
of the planner. But as Davidoff correctly points out:
"appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a
position of value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on
17
desired objectives.
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As we have already shown, pluralist theorists take a
similar stance with respect to the role of technical know-
ledge. They treat it as part of the political process. Dahl
for example, uses the terms "'professional", "technician" and
"politician" interchangeably, suggesting the political nature
of technical decisions:
Although politicians make use
of information about the world
around them, and hence depend
on 'scientific' or emrirical
elements, the actual practice of
politics by a skilled professional
is scarcely equivalent to the
activities of an experimental
physicist or biologist in a
laboratory....His knowledge is
highly imperfect. He cannot be
sure at what point rival prof-
essionals will begin to mobilize
new resources against his
policies....H18 may loose his
popularity...
According to Dahl, a professional or a politician uses
the skills at his disposal politically; that is, "depending
on the forces that generate needs for approval, popularity,
domination, manipulation, deception, candor and so on."
Dahl argued that in a pluralistic system these forces were
countervailing.
Davidoff argues that the process outlined by Dahl above
does not function properly anymore. One of the major reasons
for this is the emergence of the Public Planning Commission
which
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has separated planning from local
politics (and) has made it diff-
icult for independent commissions
to garner influential political
support. The commissions are not
responsible directly to the elec-
torate and in turn the electorate
is, at best, often indifferent to
the planning commission. 19
As a result of this the planning process and the delivery
of services and programs becomes unresponsive to the needs of
constituencies. To correct this and to pave the way for a
"pluralist" and "effective" urban democracy, advocacy planners
suggest that the function of the planner must again be polit-
icized. The basic assumption of this approach is that the
pluralist political system is basically adequate for dealing
with the issues that confront us but .it is malfunctioning.
The ills of the cities are a result of this malfunctioning.
By treating the planning process as nonpolitical, debate and
countervailing powers fail to influence decisions. Some inter-
est groups have monopolized the use of the skills of profession-
als. Planning and technical decisions are not politically
neutral. Further, they are not anymore the neutral outcome of
countervailing political interests as Dahl once claimed.
The remedy, according to advocacy planning is for the
planning process to become explicitly political. This suggestion
goes beyond Dahl's model which asserts that a professional will
decide on the basis of countervailing powers according to his
own intuition: Each group interest should now be explicitly
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represented in the planning process, It should have the cap-
acity and power to present its own plans or counterplans
which will then be mediated in a balanced pluralist process.
To paraphrase Dahl, advocacy planners suggest that "rival
professionals must begin to mobilize new resources against
government policies."
Advocacy planning is then seen as a corrective mechanism
for the pluralist process. Because of this function advocacy
rejects the claim of pluralists that no values need to be made
explicit and that, as in a market situation, all interests are
satisfied automatically, through an "invisible hand". Davidoff.
for example, claims thatt
Pluralism and advocacy are means for
stimulating consideration of future
conditions by all groups in society.
But there is one social grouD which at
present is rarticularly in need of the
assistance of Dlanners. This group
includes organizations representing
low-income families. At a time when
concern for the condition of the poor
finds institutionalization in community
action programs, it would be appropriate
for the planners concerned with such
groups to find means to plan with them.
The plans prepared for these groups
would seek to combat poverty... 2 0
Thus advocacy planning, although it is posed as a model
for the society as a whole, at present calls for partisan
action on the side of the needy groups.
The major point of Davidoff's thesis is that the political
mechanism is malfunctioning. Political decisions - to which
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planning is central - are not anymore mediated through a
pluralistic process. He criticizes the current practice of
comprehensive planning and the "unitary plan". He calls for
the deliberate politicalization of planning to enhance the
pluralist process of decision making. Davidoff appeals to
the prescriptive aspects of advocacy and pluralist theory.
Thus he asserts that
Determinations of what serves the
public interest, in a society con-
taining many diverse interest groups,
are almost always of a highly con-
tentious nature. In performing its
role of prescribing courses of action
leading to future desired states, the
planning profession must engage itself
thoroughly and openly in the contentiln
surrounding political determination.2
This however assumes that the public interest is in fact det-
ermined by programs and actions of an autonomous political
sphere of decision-making. The implication is that the ills
we are facing can be righted by reforming, by pluralizing the
political process. Davidoff even implies that the present
ills result from the malfunctioning political process rather
than from institutional decisions. Institutional economic
decisions do not figure in Davidoff's essay. His otherwise
correct criticism of comprehensive planning does not take into
account that comprehensive planning is practically non-existant
since decisions affecting the allocation of resources do not
fall within the political sphere of purposive decision making.
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Who gets what, where, why, and how, are indeed, as
Davidoff claims, "the basic political questions which need to
be raised about every allocation of public resources." But
the adequacy of those resources and the institutional constraints
placed on their allocation does not come into question. It is
assumed that the system is slack to satisfy the demands
placed on it.
Both the name and the model of advocacy planning is borr-
owed from legal practice. A planner, like a lawyer, will pres-
ent the case of his client in an arbitrating process. But in
the case of the legal practice there are laws, represented by
a judge and a jury who ultimately decide according to specific
evidence. Who decides in the case of advocacy, and according
to what? The court is enabled by laws to decide and take
action to safeguard the public interest.* These laws provide
the explicit basis on which decisione-are made. In the polit-
ical process however decisions are made on the basis of avail-
ability of resources and the exercise of power. The implicit
assumption of advocacy is that the current political process of
decision-making is indeed a pluralistic process. As pluralist
*Theodore Lowi in fact poses the model of "juridical democracy"
an an alternative to pluralism. This is quite different
from the advocacy planning model. Lowi's model of juridical
democracy is similar to a comprehensive resource allocation
plan. By restoring the "rule of law" Lowi hopes that govern-
ment programs will become explicit, and therefore democratic
and, furthermore will force the government to take concrete
action. This he sees as an alternative to interest-group
liberalism which fails in both of the above counts.
theorists claim, although resources are unequally distributed
they are equally available to all groups. The current conflicts
and the malfunctioning of political institutions are only an
expression of a temporary disequilibrium in the distribution
of resources. But groups, if properly organized, can have
access to these resources and if they articulate their inter-
ests rationally, their demands can be satisfied.
What types of power resources do the poor possess, and
can they use in a bargaining process? First they possess, and
can use the power of persuasion based on the righteousness of
their position, i.e., that they are being harmed by certain
actions and programs. Under a judicial system this power would
be enough to satisfy their claims.* In the currect political
procese, however, this power can be used to influence public
22
opinion and to pressure the government. Second, they possess
the direct political power of votes. Third, and most importantly,
they possess power which is physically manifested. Cloward and
Piven have advocated the use of disrupted tactics for the poor
to achieve their goals. Thus, Piven claims that, "the force
of the poor depends on the threat of instability...the threat
of their growing and volatile numbers in the voting booth and
23
in the streets." Similarly, Edmund Burke points out the
importance of this resource as a way of influencing the political,
*Hence Lowi's model of juridical democracy.
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process:
Change can be caused by confronting
existing power centers with the
power of numbers - an organized and
committed mass of citizenry. In
effect, a new center of power is
created, based not upon control of
wealth and institutions but upon
size and dedication ... .Demonstrat-
ions, boycotts, and picketing are
the com'mon weapns of such mass
organizations.
Finally, Davidoff and pluralist advocate planners
generally assume that planning is central to the political
process. Therefore technical .knowledge is among the deter-
mining resources in the political process. Earl Blecher, for
example, suggests that "with the increasing utilization of
technical knowledge in urban policy-making, there has been a
concurrent shift from traditional politics to emphasis on
25
resources of expertise." Lisa Peattie similarly has argued
that "the shift from politics to expertise changes the rules
for exercising power, as well as the structure of effective
26
power."
A shift in emphasis therefore is assumed from traditional
political power resources to technical resources. Viewing
technical knowledge as a power resourcewhich when possessed
and exercised will alter the outcome of planning decisions
presupposes that the planning process is responsive to inputs
that can be technically expressed. There are two reasons
why this pluralistic process is not working. First, the
powerful interests have monopolized technical knowledge. They
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have taken it away from the sphere of power resources by
claiming that it does not belong there - it is a value free
tool not to be used politically. Second, the poor cannot
adequately challenge political decisions, as they lack tech-
nical skills. The advocate planner then takes it upon him-
self to politicize again the planning process and to provide
technical resources to the deprived communities.
The process of the articulation and translation of
values and desires to rational plans is central to the
function of the advocacy planning model. As planning is
seen as central to the political process, the major resource
that is called for is technical knowledge through which values
can be translated to plans and couterplans. The importance
given to the counterplan is consistent with the pluralist
assumption that conflicting interests are mediated in an explicit
way and that the resolution of conflict and the satisfaction
of the various interests would result from bargaining and
arbitration and from the visible application of resources.
Within this model the advocate planner would perform
several functions the most important of which ares a) educ-
ation: "informing his clients of their rights under planning
and renewal laws, about the general operations of city govern-
ment....Assisting the client organization to clarify its
27
ideas and to give expression to them," b) representing and
expressing the views of his client: "the planner would plead
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for his own and his client's view of the good society" and
c) technical assistance: "he would be responsible to his client
for preparing plans and for all of the other elements compris-
29
ing the planning process".
The role of the advocate planner then is very similar to
the role of the political leader envisioned by pluralist
theory. He is responsive to group interests but he also per-
forms the vital function of articulating those interests in a
predetermined way, and of educating his client group and
channelling their activities into pluralist models of action.
Advocacy, like pluralism, requires a consensus on the
basic value and merit of the existing socioeconomic ~ instit-
utions. The advocate planner, through his role as an educator,
explicitly solicits such consensus. As Earl Blecher, in his
30
major study on advocacy planning has stated:"In the practice
of advocacy planning, there is a basic acceptance by interest
groups of the political and institutional parameters defining
the urban process." Pluralism sees apathy as representing
consensus. Advocacy suggests that apathy as well as hostile
and disruptive action, may be the result of lack of inform-
ation and ignorance on the part of community groups as to the
options available to them within the pluralist process. They
are also seen as the consequence of the shortcomings of govern-
ment agencies which, because of their bureaucratization, have
failed to respond and enhance the participation of a plurality
of interests. Thus advocacy attempts through its practice to
reform those government organizations and at the same time to
"force those whohave been critical of 'establishment' plans
to produce superior plans, rather than oly to carry out the
31
very essential obligation of criticizing plans deemed improper,"
I shall attempt to show that by assuming that the pluralist
process can adequately represent all interests, advocacy
attempts to channel protest and apathy to direct participation
in this process, overlooking the possibility that these inter-
ests may be rational expressions of objective conditions that
are inescapable to the particular institutional structure of
society.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE LOGIC-IN-USE OF ADVOCACY
It may be argued that the pluralistic framework within
which advocacy planning is placed in Davidoff's model - and
which I presented above - is not generally or explicitly accepted
by practicing advocates. .Or it may be argued that many advocate
planners are aware of the limitations of the pluralist frame-
work in dealing with wider changes in society.. As Davidoff
himself has stated:
It may very well be that advocacy
is a horrible name to describe a
movement, a social movement, that
is taking place in the field of
planning just as it is taking
place in a host of other profess-
ional fields now. It is perhaps,
mainly a shorthand way to des-
cribe a change in values, a change
in urgency and demand that has
occurred.
A "social movement" however, and a "change in values and
outlook" does not by itself prescribe any particular course
of action. But advocacy planning taken in the strict sense,
as a pluralist mode of action does provide such a framework.
Out of the whole social movement of the sixties, pluralist
advocacy planning is the only consistent theory that developed,
and it was the major alternative to traditional approaches
into which action was channelled. As Davidoff himself
suggests:
The basic theme of advocacy planning
(some would say,) is a redistribution
of power, of wealth, and other oppor-
tunities in our society, and the whole
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advocacy movement has developed
with this concern in mind. In
so doing, it has taken as one of
its functions or thrusts the
working in the communities that
I've just discussed.*
This it does, as an example, as a means of providing a
form of planning that will lead to a redistribution of power
4
and opportunity and wealth."
Pluralist advocacy planning is not only an example of a
possible action which will answer the concerns of that social
movement, but it is the major example. But whether it is one
out of many other forms or the only concrete form that the
"social movement" has taken - whether advocate planners prac-
tice it being conscious of its limitations, or they believe
it is the solution to social change - advocacy planning might
produce results which are adverse -to the values of the movement
that it came our of and, indeed, adverse to the ideal of the
*He refers to his earlier remarks that "advocate planning
has been employed as a term to describe the role of a
professional planner who goes to work with a community
organization. to be an advocate of that group's interest
in its development of plans, through the provision of
information to the community so that it can make de-
cisions about what it wishes in its plans..,2 He mentions
the two variations of the model: a) indigenous advocate
and spokesman for communities and b) community as its
own advocate. The "general meaning... that advocacy has
taken..." Davidoff said, "is that it is planning for those
who have not been well represented,...who have been
discriminated against in our society because other in-
terests have always had their planners."3
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pluralist model of social organization' (see chapter one).
Of course the two things - e.g., advocacy as a way to reform
professions versus advocacy as a way to achieve social justice
- cannot be separated. Because, by the standards of the
theory itself, a reformed profession would be one that could
achieve social justice.
My objective then here is to evaluate this particular
pluralist definition of advocacy planning from the point of
view of advocacy planning as a "social movement" and the
values and general objectives that it sets for itself.
Evaluations of advocacy planning tend to loose the
perspective of that larger context that Davidoff is talking
about. The very conference in which Davidoff made his remarks
was set up to investigate the effectiveness and evaluate the
experiences of various projects and models within this more
restricted framework of advocacy as pluralism, that is, by
accepting the basis pluralist assumptions of the practice.
This task of course was proved to be impossible by the anta-
gonism that developed between the planners and the black
community people that were represented. Their anger and
frustration contrasted sharply and illuminatingly with the
concerns of workshop leaders and advocate planners to oper-
ationalize this frustration, to translate it to guidelines,
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specification and recommendations.* As the chairman of the
conference put it:
we did not get very far in regard
to the development of a more sophist-
icated understanding of a pluralist plan-
ning process and the nature, theory and
practice of democracy nor did we come
up with any systematic sets of rec-
comendations concerning how or if
that which has been called advocacy
planning could be operationalized or
rationalized in a way more acceptable
than had been the case 6or apparently the
case up to that point.
Similarly, much of the literature on advocacy planning,
defines the problems operationally. Models, roles and prac-
tices are evaluated in terms of how well they represent comm-
unity interests, or how well they involve communities in the
7
planning process. Thus Piven discusses the effectiveness
8
of planning versus direct action, Kramer evaluates the
effectiveness of the role of the "inside" versus that of the
"outside" advocate to represent local interests. There have
been exhaustive categorizations of advocacy planning types.
These are usually based on the purpose of advocacy organiz-
ations, the identification of the organization's clientele,
*The leader of a workshop which was dominated by expressions
of anger and rejection such as: "You cannot, as white plan-
ners, work in my best interest. History wasn't planned"
and (sarcastically): "I need a planner to tell me what is
the extent of my need", summarized the above concerns as
follows:
"Professionals in the Ghetto:
- They must have political awareness;
Preferably they should be black
- Whites can be acceptable, but they
should be a last choice," etc.5
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financing, methods of the organization; including styles and
tactics, degree and type of community involvement, motives of
the actors, time and duration of projects. Two of the most
comprehensive studies on advocacy planning - evaluations
9
commissioned and funded by OEO - by Shostak and Blecher
undertake such a comparative analysis of the various models
which are useful only if one has an understanding of the
limitations of the modele' outcomes, which are imposed not
by the particular nuances of each model but by the general
context in which the model is practiced.
The antagonism then that was exhibited at the conference
can be seen as a collective condemnation of advocacy planning
projects, an expression of inadequacy of the advocacy framework
which cannot be corrected by altering the particular modes
of operation within that framework - such as asking for black
planners to represent black interests, or for the community
to be its own planner.
Limitations of Practice Imposed by Objectives of Sponsors
First, certain impositions are placed on the goals and the
practice of advocacy by the organizational demands of those
institutions that have sponsored the various projects and
advocacy planning organizations. Advocacy planning has
developed as part of the community participation movement.
The organizational form that this movement took was largely
84
shaped by the War on Poverty Act of 1964 and the Community
Action Program, and the Model Cities legislation. Many
authors have argued that the purpose of those Acts and of
the Citizen Participation Movement was to integrate the apath-
etic or hostile new migrants in the political process, or to
coopt demands and ensure implementation of government programs.
10
Shery Arnstein,Melvin Yogulof and others have argued
that citizen participation projects can have various functions
ranging from cooptation and manipulation to contention and
citizen control. As it has already been documented, cooptat-
ion and manipulation was the main function of citizen parti-
11
cipation in urban renewal.
Most importantly advocacy planning was influenced by the
Community Action Program and the Poverty Act of 1964 which
called for "maximum feasible participation" of the poor.
The program acted as a catalyst in the establishment of
advocacy planning and gave it direction and support, by
providing financial assistance, and an institutional frame-
work to community organizations and to advocacy agencies.
Although the aims and assumptions of the act are not
12
altogether explicit or clear there is ample evidence in
both its history and its practice that points to the plural-
istic basis of the act. It was a response to the insight that
traditional administrative structures and programs, and volun-
tary organizations were incapable of solving the urban ghetto
85
problem and that new structures should be built. Its fore-
runners, the Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Projects headed by
Paul Yluisaker (which was to provide youth employment,
education and services to communities); and Kennedy's Comm-
ittee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime assumed that
poverty is not a problem of the individual that invites
psychiatric solution. Based on the theories of Durkheim
and Merton, thepprofessionals of the fifties - particularly
Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward asserted that anomie, and
alienation are related to the problem of deviant behavior
and delinquency. These problems therefore were seen not as
properties of the individual but of the social structure.
The primary functional mechanism in this theory is the
group, which gives direction, and rewards behavior consistent
to its values. These programs then were largely conceived
as providing new substitutes for traditional structures that
13
had broken down.
The CAP was not conceived as a way of overcoming plur-
alism but as a way of restoring it as a basis for rational
politics. Although these projects rejected the idea that the
problem is with the poor and accepted a social definition of
it, they still attempted to solve the problem by attacking
apathy itself rather than the institutions that cause poverty.
The evaluation of the outcomes of one such CAP exper-
ience by Cloward and Elman, is particularly illuminating.
The result of the project was that
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many more people from Stanton Street
are on welfare than before. The
storefront's clients are better
clothed, better housed, and better
fed than they were four years ago.
Many how have telephones, quite a few
have washing machines and television
sets.
Are they better people? Are
they worse? Such questions seem
like the supreme irrelevancy. For
if they are not better for their
improved economic circumstances, the
society is better for their actions
against it.1
The function of CAP's was seen as restoring participation
and the role of social organizations such as welfare agencies
and bureaucratic administrations whose lost primary function
was seen as enhancing the competitive urban process.
In a manner similar to advocacy planning the Poverty
Program assumes that public agencies through bureaucratization
and by being separated from the political process do not any-
more perform the vital pluralist function of (a) being res-
ponsive to group and political interests and (b) insuring
access of all groups to the pluralist process.
The poverty program, like the Urban Renewal Program
does not get at the real causes of poverty. While Urban
Renewal assumed that poverty and social problems were caused
by environmental factors, the War of Poverty assumes that
the cause of poverty is "being poor". The old welfare
program (the Social Security Act of 1935) recognized the
same thing and it attempted not to remedy, but to ease the
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problem through a series of clear and concrete programs. In
a sense then the old welfare program accepts the assumption
that poverty is an objective phenomenon, a result of the
institutionalized decision processes. It does not pretend
to attempt to change those processes. As Lowi states: "Old
Welfare was and is a(n immensely successful) means of tending
to the human exhaust of capitalism .... The purpose of Old Welfare
was and is to make the march to the grave a bit more comfort-
15
able." The assumptions of the War on Poverty and the CAP
are that poverty is not an objective phenomenon caused by
institutionalized decisions, but rather it is a result of a
vicious circle which can be attacked by reforming and re-
structuring the pluralistic process and thus by treating the
poor as a group rather than as a condition. The state had
lost its function of ensuring the access of groups to the
political process through its various institutions (welfare
agencies, schools, employment offices, etc.) The task was
to resurrect the function of those institutions.
The CAP was thus conceived merely as an integrating
16
mechanism into the political pluralistic process.
Those who subscribe to a conspiratorial view of history,
as Bertram Beck suggests,
would imagine the most powerful
figures in the military-industrial
complex designing an anti-poverty
program whereby poor people who do
not participate in standard polit-
ical processes would be diverted to
toy elections and to fighting
88
among themselves over the control
of pitifully inadequate sums of
money. One could well imagine the
leaders of such a complex encouraging
the drive for community control with
the knowledge that local sovereignty
has always been the rallying cry of
the reactionaries.17
In that vein for example, Frances Piven has suggested
in several articles that the CAP and the War on Poverty
were not merely integrating mechanisms into the political
process but specifically a strategy of the Democratic Party
to organize and integrate into its ranks a new constituency.
The net effect of the events of the fifties was for the
Democratic Party to loose its base in the South, and to be
threatened by the crisis in the North. Thus, according to
Piven,
(Kennedy) Administration analysts
began to explore new programs for
the cities that might cement the
allegiance of the urban black vote to
the national party and stimulate local
Democratic organizations to be more
responsive to the new voters....
Whatever the actual social benefits
(of the programs that followed),
they also met the political needs
of the Democratic Administration in
adjusting to population changes in
the cities...(such programs) can be
understood as a strategy to integrate
the new migrants into the political
structure of the city by offering them
various forms of patronage distributed
by local "citizen participants" whom 18the projects selected and cultivated.
89
Professionals, "many of whom were called 'advocates"', were
important for the execution of the strategy. Except for the
jobs that were provided indirectly to professionals, through
the funding of various CAPs, the Office of Economic Opportunity
funded directly professional advocacy planning agencies,
ARCH in New York, UPA in Cambridge, CDC in San Francisco,
among others. It is argued that this was a deliberate polit-
ical decision on the part of OEO. In 1967, a crisis situation
occurred when the passage of the OEO bill was met with consid-
erable opposition in the Congress from conservative members
who claimed that "extremist groups have seized it (the CAP)
19
as a forum for dissent.
This view was shared by radicals themselves. Stanley
Aronowitz was reported for example, in a conservative weekly,
"attacking the entire Poverty Program except for a single
aspect which he described as a 'valuable tool' for the radical
movement. 'At least", he said, 'it has given employment to
20
the organizers'."
The response of the Congress made it clear that the restruc-
turing of basic institutions was not the objective of CAP.
Concern grew over the "obstructionist" attitudes of citizen
groups and their protest and confrontation to planning and
implementation. The solution to this, as I shall explain
below, was more controlled participation.
There was concern in the Congress that OEO and CAP acitv-
ities were not producing positive results in urban development.
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The view of OEO officials was very similar to that of advocate
planners: Plans affecting poor communities were seen as ex-
pressing powerful interests. The poor affected by the plans
had no way of learning of the plans or expressing their own
interests until too late so that the only strategy that was
left to them was an "all-or-nothing" confrontation and obstruc-
tionism. In an internal CEO memorandum outlining the need for
advocacy planning programs, Michael Mazer, programs officer
of the Housing Branch of OEO stated that
poor people have become unwilling
to accept official decisions which they
had no part in formulating....They have
learned how to build community organiz-
ations to oppose official action. With
increasing sophistication they have been
more and more able-to delay or derail
official ro grams and to save them-
selves and their neighbors from pro-
grams which threaten their own best
interest.21
The way out of this problem was to turn disruptive
community action to constructive proposals. "The problem is
to turn these organizations to constructive ends and to capit-
alize on the growing official understanding of the need for
meaningful citizen participation in the planning process...."
Maser said, "Redevelopment activities cannot be carried on
unless effective citizen participation is integrated into the
22
planning process...."
The way to achieve this and overcome "obstructionism"
was thought to be through technical skill and knowledge of the
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planning process so that poor people could present and art-
iculate their demands in a constructive way. Hence the funding
by OEO of advocacy planning projects which would "make avail-
able architects, planners, financial analysts, and other
specialists so that communities can organize their protests
23
around viable alternatives."
This strategy of OEO, which corresponded to advocacy
planning as it was first formulated by Davidoff, shaped the
practice of advocacy at least until 1969. If the strategy
was modified later to consider other models of advocacy action,
such as establishing community advocacy planning organizations
with local control of planning skills and activities, the basic
pluralist assumptions on the nature of "the plan" and the plan-
ning process remained the same.
The direction and the particular function that this
strategy implies for advocacy is clear. To the extent that
advocate planners have been under hire by such public agencies
as OEO, one would expect them to be responsive to the interest
of those agencies. This of course is not a sufficient argument
for analyzing and criticizing advocacy. One can argue that an
advocacy organization in .its funding proposal will and does
present its work in a way that is consistent with the interests
of the sponsoring agency, so that there is quite a discrepancy
between what the organization claims it does and what it
actually does. Further, in a similar manner one would expect
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the OEO officials to present a strategy in a way that is
satisfactory to the Congress while their own aims and behavior
in running the agency follow different objectives. Both of
these points are true, in the experience of at least one major
advocacy planning organization. But in either case the changes
and reform programs that have been funded by the government
did have a specific political objective: to coopt and integrate
dissenting and ayathetic constituencies. This objective may
not have been imposed directly on the practice of advocacy
through the selective funding and other possible controls over
projects but it provided the limits of advocacy practice in
the aggregate scale.
To develop a sufficient argument, one must look at the
concrete practice of advocacy rather than just the demands
of the sponsors. I shall therefore look at the practice of
advocacy planning to discuss how the pluralist assumptions
are manifested in the experience of advocacy projects and to
see to what extent the perceived limitations of the outcomes
of such projects can be explained by the pluralist assumptions
of various advocacy models rather than by their own imperfection.
Issues and Constituencies: Group Interests and the Clients
of Advocacy
The existence of large and active community participation
in the planning process is seen by advocates as instrumental
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to the effective practice of pluralist democracy. If only
the poor show an active interest in the planning process, they
can insert their own values in it and affect the decisions in
a way beneficial to them.
Most projects however, discover that the poor are in-
different and often hostile to the planning process. For
example, in my own experience in the Holyoke project (see
Appendix) the neighborhood residents showed an active inter-
est when they were threatened by the Master Plan but became
silent and apathetic when time came to develop alternative
plans for their neighborhood.
The observation that the client groups are mobilized
when they are adversely affected by pi.anning decisions while
they show no active interest in participating in the process
of developing alternatives seems to be common to advocacy
planning projects.
The client, or constituency is usually those interest
groups that have been left out of or hurt by the planning
process. They are referred to as 'community groups', 'the
poor', 'the neighborhood'. The difficulty which we encountered
and which is often pointed out in the literature is that
communities are apathetic and disorganized.
Some social scientists have argued that lack of partici-
pation is explained by "the inability of the poor to compre-
hend theoretical formulations and to conceptualize well enough
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to gain a complete understanding of causative factors to which
24
a program whould be directed?"
Pluralists, like Dahl, claim that the poor do not parti-
cipate because they are by nature apathetic. -Advocate planners
suggest that it is because they have no inforration on the
available opportunity strUcture and thus do not know how to
use it for their benefit. But' in fact the experience of various
advocacy projects shows that explaining the opportunity
structure and providing the necessary technical information,
helping the poor "to design the political strategies needed to
achieve the.group's priorities" and "to conceptualize what
25
programmatic approaches will benefit the community" does
not necessarily bring with it active community participation.
The poor show little concern about being left out of the
planning process until they are Adversely affected by it and
then they attempt to obstruct the plans. They will take
action only in response to a threat. In fact, a "community"
will only be identified as such in a situation where it is
threatened. As Lisa Peattie points out:
Community organizations tend to
appear...as a response to a threat:
'the neighborhood' or 'the community,
comes to be articulated as that area
about to be affected by some public
policy, as in an urban renewal program.
It is the organizations that appear to
'represent' such 'communities' which
are likely to be the natural clients
for the advocate planner.26
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A political decision such as the Urban Renewal Plan in
the South End and the Master Plan in, the City of Holyoke,
confronts the community directly, and being political it has
to do with values. The community therefore, if affected by
it, will assert its own values, and will take an active role
in that process employing its resources - technical or physical
and vocal - to change the decision.
As Dahl has stated, then, the poor will be mobilized,
will rise out of their apathy and take political action,
only when they are directly, and adversely, affected by
political decisions. A graphic and illuminating example is
given by a participant in the Conference on Advocacy and
Pluralist Planning. Explaining the problem they had in
this community in getting the residents involved, .he enum-
erated various techniques for bring prople to the meetings:
Another technique was to stop at
doors and seem to be writing some-
thing, like a city official. The
next day, you send out a bill saying
that they'd better come to a meeting.
We had to use this sneaky technique
for a long time. We told them that
the bulldozer was coming through.
We then selected an area where
people weren't interested: two blocks
say.. Our people then knocked at the
doors and said they were from the
Housing Department. The people
would say, 'why our house?'. We'd
say, 'Well, you don't come to a
meeting, we didn't think you care'.
We even brought in the railroad....
We went saying to people who weren't
showing too much interest that they
had to move the railroad tracks from
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down near the river to the
middle of their neighborhood.
'You'd better get out (to a
meeting), if you don't wai
that to happen', we'd say
Similarly in the Holyoke Project it seers that we made
the tactical error of not pushing the development plan at
the same time the community was mobilized in opposing the
Master Plan.
The common experience then is that homo civicus, to use
Dahl's terminology, is indeed not interested in participating-
in the political and planning process for the sake of the
process itself. He is interested in it only in the case that
he is adversely affected by it.* This is not because homo
civicus is a species naturally apathetic to political processes
nor is it because the community has no information or resources.
Nor is it because he is not interested in the political or
planning process unless this process produces plans that
threaten his interests. I shall contend, rather, that commun-
ities are indeed interested in political processes that affect
*Our contacts with the Holyoke neighborhood (see Appendix)
were almost exclusively representative of homo politicus.
They showed.interest in the process because, as Dahl points
out, they received personal gratification from that process.
Their interest in the process was not directly related to
the concept of politics and planning as purposive action.
This was not true with the larger community which had
nothing to gain from 'participating as a value in itself.'
In the early meetings, suggestions of local leaders, tot-
ally alien to the interests of the community, were expressed,
such as that we "should tear down existing housing units
and replace them with high rise apartment houses over-
looking the river."
9?
them (whether adversely or not) but that they have been alienated
from such processes because the latter have been used as in-
struments of the powerful interests.
Apathy cannot be explained by lack of time, interest,
intelligence, or skills, Nor can it be explained away as
something natural to certain individuals. It is, rather, the
result of the primary function that the political process
performs: an appendage to, and a mechanism to solidify
institutionalized decision mechanisms and the consequent
unequal distribution of power.
It has. often been pointed out that the middle classes
are more actively involved in the political process, than
the poor communities. The alternative explanation then
would seem to be, as Lisa Peattie suggests, that
as things work, the institutions
with which people may collaborate
or negotiate are responding part-
icularly to the pressure of middle
class interests, and are (not oddly)
more relevant to those interests
than they are to thog of the
people at the bottom
Further, as I have argued, the objective condition of the
poor is not an object of political decision mechanisms. Such
mechanisms deal with this condition only insofar as they can
translate it into a set of 'rational, and quantitative demands,
'Being poor' is not an issue that communities organize around.
The immediate issue is the highway that will dislocate them,
the late paycheck, rent, or the master plan that poses an
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immediate threat to them. As a result, the "mobilization of
bias" that emerges from such a restricted use of political
decisions, suggests that objective conditions which are det-
ermined by institutionalized decision mechanisms, are natural
or given, rather than historical, and objects of purposive
action. Institutionalized decisions are not confronted polit-
ically but individually. A person will do what is rational
within the existing institutional constraints rather than
challenge those constraints. To- be poor is dealt with by
attempting to overcome poverty on a personal basis rather than
by changing- national priorities and institutionalized mech-
anisms.
The issues then tend to define the "community" and there-
fore the advoacte's client. Although advocates speak of"the
poor" as a class with common problems of their own, the clients
are not taken as representatives of that class but as 'neigh-
borhoods and 'communities' with their own particular problems
whose only common characteristic is discrimination in the
planning process and their lack of technical resources. Thus
"community" tends to be defined along issues that are results
of political decisions rather than institutional ones.
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The Role of the Advocate Planner and the Use of Technical
and Other Resources
Various models are discussed in the planning literature
on the role of the advocate as a spokesman of community
needs. Marshall Kaplan distinguishes between the "inside"
("indirect") advocate and the "outside" ("direct") advocate.
The inside or indirect role is one in which the planner is
employed by a public agency or the government through which
he attempts to discover the needs of the poor and advocate
them in the agency. This first model is based on what
Moynihan has called the ."professionalization of reform".
The professional and the planner discover for the poor what
the issues are. In fact, according to this view it is the
professionals such as Michael Harrington with his The Other
America who rediscovered poverty.- Thus, according to Moynihan
"the poverty program was declared not as the behest of the
poor; it was declared in their interest by persons confident
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of their own judgment in such matters."
Through social indicators, or marketing techniques, or
other research methods the planner discovers the issues and
local interests and acts as a spokesman. The role of the
planner in this model is very similar to the role that
Robert Dahl sees the professional performing. Without
overtly working for and representing specific interests,
he is sensitive to different values-and political pressures.
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According to an earlier paper by Davidoff, "It is not for
the planner to make the final decision transforming values
into policy commitments. His role is to identi-fy the distrib-
ution of values among people, and how values are weighed
30
against each other.'
A second, more direct model and the most common in the
practice is that of the 'outside' or 'direct'advocate. In
this case the planner - no matter who pays him - is directly
responsible to his clients: the community groups that he
directly represents in the planning process. This is the
model that advocacy planning calls for. The advocate planner
should make explicit his own values and the interests he
represents. The planning process should be explicitly
pluralized rather than remain neutral under the guise of
automatic regulation through countervailing forces.
Community groups and frustrated local residents have
often argued that both of the above models are inadequate,
that white advocates do not understand the problems of
black communities, that no results are in sight, that the
issues become too technical, and that more action is needed.
This was obvious in the Conference on Advocacy and Pluralism
in Planning (see above) where community participants expressed
their frustration with the current practices of advocacy.
The attempt to operationalize this frustration has led
to suggestions on two alternative models of planning. The
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first model suggests that "the white advocate is the wrong
person to act as the advocate. The thought grows that the
black community may very well wish to have a black spokesman
and that the advocate, if there is such an advocate in the
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community, should be a black man." Several advocacy agencies
operate on that models ARCH, and 2MJJQ in Harlem and the Black
Design Workshop in New Haven. One of those groups has gone
as far as to suggest that
black trained designer-planners,
sworn and dedicated to the promotion,
protection and advocacy of black
planning interests are a (if not
the) crucial missing link in the
struggle of inner city black
people to acquire the control
they are now demanding for their
communities.32
A final model that is suggested as a way of overcoming
the problem of discrepancy of values and representation be-
tween planner and community is that the community act as
its own spokesman and advocate. As Davidoff put its
another idea has been developed...
that the community should not have
to rely on an expert to advocate for
them; that the community will grow
weak if it calls upon an outsider
to be their advocate. The community
must advocate its own interests and
increasingly communities in our
cities have become sophisticated
on the techniques of presentation.
In such communitites there still
might be a role for the advocate
planner...to provide the technical
assistance and the information
necessary to permit a community to
develop a plan.3 3
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What is crucial in these models is that technical skills
and information are still seen as the instrumental resource.
The Davidoffs, for example, see the alternatives in the follow-
ing manners
If the planners for minority groups
are middle-class white professionals...
then manipulation of the clients by
those professionals and imposition
of the professionals' ideas upon the
clients will always be a potential
danger.
Neither of these outcomes need
raise problems if we accept the
elitist notion that the professional
knows best about what the client should
do. If we reject the elitist notion
of social change, as we do, then a
planning process prior to action
calls for participation by the group
for whose benefit the action is
planned, and the poor people and
blacks must therefore be "planners";
that is they must have some set of
concepts to guide them in making
decisions about iaveloping their
political power.
In this view, then, the value of the planning process
and therefore of planning skills is still paramount. As in
all of the above models, the resources that the advocate
planner possesses and provides, technical skills, are very
important. The planner, black or white, will still have to
educate and inform the community "to permit it to develop
a plan." A conviction that black advocates are the missing
link is a conviction that technical resources are the answer
and that the political process has the slack to provide for
the most radical demands.
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What is usually not dealt with in these models, is that
technical knowledge itself is not value-free. Perlman and
Jones have observed that:
the question of what to do becomes
a question of what can be done, for
the choice of a policy for action
must be realistic in the light of
resistance to change that can be
anticipated. The strategy to
follow must be related to oppor-
tunities that are available in the
real world of competing interests,
if it to be more than a Utopian
dream.
This observation is confirmed by the experience of many advocacy
projects. In the appendix, I give a detailed account of how
this is the case in my own experience, particularly in the
Holyoke project. Once the issues and the problems of a
community are identified (such as lack of services, deter-
ioration of housing, blight, lack of open space, etc) the
selection of concrete goals and strategies and scenarios for
achieving them is circumscribed by the available opportunity
structure. If a planner (whether a professional or the
community itself) draws up an idealized plan for the community,
of what needs to be done, and how the community would look
like in an ideal situation, then this plan is of no practical
value to the community. It is only a utopian projection on
the basis of which no action can be taken and no strategy
can evolve since it does not correspond to any of the avail-
able opportunities. Nonetheless, such utopian plans are often
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drawn with dangerous conseauences. They serve as a way of
raising the hopes of the clients without the benefit of in-
forming them of how the goals of such plans could be pursued
and attained, thus frustrating their desires and hopes and
whatever trust they have on the planning process.
Advocate planners, then, are forced by the circumstances
to bypass or superimpose on the idealized plan, one that will
identify concrete and attainable goals and translate them into
instrumental objectives identifying the various strategies -
existing city, state, and federal programs - that can be
pressured and utilized.
Therefore, through technical skills an objective condition
of a community is translated into a series of demands that are
marketable in the existing pluralistic process. The function
that advocate planners and their technical skills perform is
very similar to the function of social scientists in the classic
Hawthorne experiment. A statement such as "wages are too low"
which expresses an objective condition of a certain social
class, is personalized, it becomes rational by being trans-
lated into the statement "worker x's earnings, due to his
wife's illness, are insufficient to meet his current obligations."
Or a statement such as "the community is deteriorating" is
again translated into concrete demands for housing subsidies,
improvement of services, etc. Technical skill is taken to
mean the knowledge and ability to translate needs and apply
the appropriate existing technologies for solving them.
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But the technological solutions are limited not only in terms
of the existing level of technology and scarcity, but they are
also limited by the specific productive relations and political
institutions. Technical knowledge carries with it the bias
of the existing political process. Thus, technical knowledge
in specific terms for the planner means knowledge of FHA
regulations and government housing programs and procedures,
local housing cod.es, urban renewal and model cities regulations,
public housing regulations, real estate law, etc. (plus formal
planning skills such as data gathering and analysis). As
Lisa Peattie has stated: "the power to conceptualize is a
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power to mAnipulate." No matter who possesses this power
to conceptualize, the technical skills of the planner, poss-
esses the power to manipulate.
Lisa Peattie suggests that the advocate planner "is not
and can never be a simple channel through which flow the
'interests of community'. Those interests become transformed
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as they pass into the planner's technical framework." The
question then of whether the planner can act as a spokesman
of community interests is not based on the attitudes of the
particular planner and therefore cannot be resolved by
changing the planner, or by handing the appropriate skills
over to the community. The question is structural; it has
to do with those skills themselves. What is perceived as
a failure on the part of planners to represent community
interests is a failure of the technical planning framework.
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The frustration of community groups cannot be perceived
as a failure or lack of communication between planner and
community which can simply be corrected by the direct transfer
of skills to local leaders. As Lisa Peattie points out:
The agenda...is largely set...
by the action opportunity structure.
The items for the agenda are
presented by the available pro-
grams and institutions and tneir
priority must reflect the necessity
of dealing with and the possibility
of taking aqvantage of the programs
that exist.-'/
Thus advocacy planning simply transfers the rationality and
neutrality of technical knowledge from the overall political
decision-making process to the community. Technical knowledge
is not altered; it is simply transposed: Roland Warren has
pointed out that "the injection of rational-technical con-
siderations (under this model)...occurs in relation to certain
of the respective parties to the political decision-making
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process rather than in relation to the whole process."
Advocate planners have always asserted that technical
knowledge is not value-free. But they have based this assert-
ion on the fact that knowledge and skills are monopolized by
powerful interests. I have argued here that technical skill
is value loaded for the additional reason that it is biased
in terms of suggesting certain kinds of action-compatible
with the existing opportunity structure - while excluding
others - action that now seems utopian even though our society
has the productive capacity and the potential to make it
possible and real once the institutionalized constraints
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are altered. Is it possible to develob a kind of knowledge
that does not present the drawbacks 6f utopianism and at the
same time does not restrict the alternatives to the existing
and inadequate opportunity structure? This question will be
40
left open at this point.
As with pluralism, advocacy planning, although conceived
as an alternative to the elitist, value-free model of public
interest planning, reverts back to elitism. The advocate
planner, although he is supposed to politicize the plannirg
process and represent the interests of, and be answerable to
his low-income clients, performs the important function
of checking his clients, giving a direction to their actions
and channelling their dissatisfaction and their demands within
the existing political system.
The elitism that is exhibited by the logic-in-use of
pluralism and advocacy is not pursued as a value in itself,
i.e., its function is not to justify a privileged position for
planners and technicians - although advocacy planning has been
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accused of this. Rather, it is pursued for its function
as a socializing and a stabilizing force. The emphasis is
not on the advocate planner but on the technical resources
that he possesses. It is the technical resources that per-
form the function of integration rather than the planner
himself. The planner is only the carrier of those resources.
Therefore the various alternatives given to advocacy planning
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models, as long as they rely on the same assumpition as to the
nature of political institutions, and as long as they bypass
the objective conditions of the community and channel the local
resources to the pluralist process. are subjected to the same
limitations and the same criticism as pluralist theory.
Several planners have criticized advocacy planning in
that it diverts by its emphasis on skills and the planning
process, from other, more effective kinds of action. They
claim that traiditional resources such as disruptive action
and demonstrations are more effective than planning in bringing
about change. In the conference on Advocacy and Pluralist
Planning, mentioned earlier, the last remarks were made by a
self-proclaimed "black and proud street nigger":
Tell the system to stop planning
us into trickbags. We are human
beings and we will soon react like
humans. The Federal government will
not plan anything in the best inter-
ests of oppressed people ... .All the
changes that have come about in the
last two years have come about
through the action of street niggers,
....We will call for technical
assistangq and foreign aid when we
need it.
This contrasted sharply with the remarks of an advocate
planner made earlier:
If the money that is shut off to the
kinds of groups that have been en-
couraged and developed in the
neighborhood are not allowed to
exist in the future.... Then the
kinds of things we may see in the
neighborhood will ~be a new kind
of resident participation, probably
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not involving some of the people
who have been involved today, but
involving others who are going to be
concerned with quick action and I
think we know what kind of quick
action this may be.
The most outspoken critic of advocacy planning on this
issue is Frances Piven who claims that "A plan, of itself, is
not force... Involving local groups in elaborate planning
procedures is to guide them into a narrowly circumscribed
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form of political action." Piven brings the example of
an advocacy planning project, the "Alternate Plan for Cooper
Square" which relied heavily on technical resourcesa
After ten years of arduous effort...
a small portion of the Alternate Plan
had been given formal sanction even
though that portion was still far
from implementation. The chief
accomplishment was that the neigh-
borhood had stopped the early threat
of renewal. As Walter Thabit said
sourly when it was-all over, 'Protest 45
without planning could have done as much'.
Piven concludes that
the advocates are coaxing ghetto leaders
(and local groups) off the streets and
away from the trouble they might make
there, and absorbing them in elaborate
procedures called planning procedures
which are effective indeed in dampening
any impulse for the disruptive activities
which have always been the gin political
resources of the very poor.
Piven - and others - argue that the needs that people
have should be expressed directly, without a technical
mediating process and that governmental institutions should
be confronted in a direct fashion. Although several advocate
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planners see disruptive tactics as dettimental to the
pluralist process and advocate exclusively the use of tech-
nical skills, in fact, it is not clear from observing the
practice of advocacy that Piven is right in her observations.
Advocacy planning projects have attempted to use those
observable power resources in various degrees and have em-
ployed differing tactics - according to the leverage points
allowed by the situation and the particular outlook of the
participants. In various projects around the Boston area,
for example, power resources have been used imaginatively
with varying degrees of success. When normal channels of
public pressure and the judicial process did not work in
persuading a landlord to repair his apartments, tenants re-
sorted to picketting his suburban home so that his own peers
would put pressure on him. When public authorities did not
respond to citizen pressure and countless counterplans, and
went ahead with demolishing much needed housing units in the
South Endthe residents resorted to obstructive tactics:
occupying and squatting into empty buildings, and occupying
public property, disrupting its current use as a parking lot
and building shacks and tents on it to demonstrate the urgent
need for housing, When the plight of large dislocated fam-
ilies did not persuade the city of Lynn to provide a working
program which adequately covers their need, citizens' organ-
izations resorted to the courts to seek action to block a
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3.9 million dollar renewal bond issue,'and successfully took
action to vote out of office the uncooperative mayor and city
council members.
The use of force and disruption is just another resource
that the poor possess in pressuring the political process.
The alternative that Piven suggests - disruptive rather than
counterplan - is only a use of a different tactic but it is
addressed to the same system of politics. It may be more
efficacious, as she point out, in bringing about results,
and certainly the examples mentioned above support her argument.
It increases the costs of the normal functioning of instit-
utions and thus it can bring more pressure to political mech-
anisms. But it is still addressed to the same political
mechanisms that the counterplan is addressed to. It still
assumes that political mechanisms can respond to interest
group demands. Protest and disruption can sometimes be more
effective than the counterplan as a tactic, but their effect-
iveness is circumscribed by the same constraints that advocacy
planning is limited by. The example of the Cooper Square
project that Piven uses, is a good case in point. It is
possible, as she and Walter Thabit suggest that protest
could have more effectively and more quickly stopped the
"early threat of renewal." It is doubtful however, that
protest could have been more successful than the counter-
plan in achieving positive results and in implementing the
Alternate Plan for Cooper Square.
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Sumner Rosen, who adheres to the pluralist model of
politics, criticizes Piven by arguing that
Any political system survives
because those who run it under-
stand and respond to the expression
of needs, whether these take organ-
ized or disorganized form, whether
they are made manifest through normal
channels or through the mobilization
of people in the streets. 7
In other words, the alternative that Piven suggests is only
tactical, and by itself it cannot significantly alter the
nature of the outcomes of the practice, although it can be
more effective in bringing about those outcomes,
The Limitations of Political Decisions
Advocacy planning, like pluralism, does not recognize the
limitations of the political institutions. As I have argued
in the previous chapter, it does this, often, by consciously
and deliberately assuming the autonomy of politics, that is,
by accepting the framework of pluralist theory, and its assump-
tions that all needs can be satisfied whgn properly presented
and mediated in the political process.
Whether in fact advocate planners explicitly accept the
pluralist model or not, the practice of advocacy as shown
above exhibits the limitations of the pluralist model. The
urge to produce concrete results and short term benefits for
the specific community and interest group that the advocate
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represents, necessitates a direct involvement within the
political process; issues tend to be defined, by necessity,
along the lines dictated by the existing "opportunity structure"
and available programs. As Marshall Kaplan put it:
(Advocacy) implies evolutionary rather
than revolutionary changes in the
institutional or delivery system...
alternatives with respect to the
relationships would vary by issue,
by community, by stage in the plan-
ning process, by available resources
and recorded priorities....Given the
complex problems facing the poor, plans
premised on ideologies are, at best,
irrelevant and at -worst, harmful to
the specific interests of the poor for
they represent unreal, often misplaced,
abstractions.4 8
The "specific interests" of the poor that Kaplan has in
mind are not the objective interests. In the practice of
advocacy, objective interests are seen as 'unreal' andlutopian,
since there is no mechanism in the existing opportunity struc-
ture to deal with them. Thus issues tend to be defined along
local and "available opportunity" lines rather than as results
of institutional mechanisms that require more fundamental
changes.
Advocacy planning is, therefore, instrumental in coopting
demands not in terms of ensuring the implementation of specific
programs (as it was the case with 'citizens participation in
Urban Renewal) but in terms of channelling demands to a
political process which it claims to be pluralistic. To avert
the social conflict that could potentially develop (as it did
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in the Urban riots) out of the consequences of institutional-
ized decisions, the state, and the political decision mechan-
isms translate these consequences (which we have called here
objective conditions) into marketable, quantitative, and piece-
meal demands: wages, hours, housing subsidies, etc. They inte-
grate them into the sphere of 'rational' pluralist politics.
Advocate planners, who explicitly accept the pluralist
assumptions, claim that there is nothing wrong with integration.
In this view integration is not peen as something wrong but as
something necessary. Sumner Rosen, (in response to Piven's
criticism on the integrating function of advocacy planning),
claims that "any political system survives because those who
run it understand and respond to the .expression of needs whether
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these take an organized or disorganized form".
One thing that is certain from observing the outcome of
various advocacy planning projects is that if the practice
was conceived by those who sponsored it as a strategy for
coopting affected communities and ensuring the implementation
of various projects such as urban renewal then this strategy
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failed. As it has often been pointed out advocacy planning
projects have been most successful in a negative sense. In
only one of my experiences the result has been to insure the
implementation of a project. And still that was by no means
the fault of the advocate planner: my involvement with the
Roxbury Library Committee (see Appendix). Usually though,
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advocacy planning projects have been most uccessful in their
opposition to various programs. Highways have been stopped
and urban renewal bulldozers have been turned around. But
apart from this negative success, the positive outcomes of
advocacy planning have been very limited.
Advocacy planning has been incapable of producing any
results in the sphere of initiation of projects. This lack of
success cannot be attributed to the lack of technical skills,
or lack of community interest in that stage of planning. When
Urban Planning Aid was asked to help a community group in
Bbston's South End to fight a highschool project which called
for demolition of 400 housing units, it was able to achieve
its ends through a concerted effort with the community. But
as Dennis Blackett, then a director of UPA, explained, "when
they (the community) got the opportunity to stay there, they
then wanted to build housing. That was exactly that point where
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UPA was no longer able to be effective." Similarly, in my
experience with the Holyoke Project (see Appendix) the advocates
and the community were successful in deleting that part of the
Master Plan that was a threat to the neighborhood. But in
our attempts to implement plans that would rehabilitate the
community we were unsuccessful.
The contention here, with all modesty, is that these
limitations, that have been observed in the outcomes of advocacy
projects, cannot be blamed exclusively or predominantly on
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limitations of specific models of planhing and on our own
ineffectiveness as planners, but rather on the nature of the
political institutions to which advocacy planning channels its
resources, As I have argued in Chapter II, the political
decision mechanism contains inherent limitations in satisfying
demands placed on it. Adirocacy planning in attempting to
manipulate the political process - the various government
programs that exist - produces an outcome which is determined
not only by the available resources and skills that the planner
has, and by the degree of participation by community groups,
but it is also determined by factors external to the advocacy
planning process: the limitations of the pluralist institutions
themselves.
First, the funds that these programs possess are limited,
The possible material outcomes of advocacy planning projects
are, therefore, also limited:
a) Advocacy planning projects can reform bureaucratic
institutions such as welfare organizations to make full use
of their authority and resources in providing services for
the poor. One example of this is the experience and the
strategy that Frances Piven calls for, in New York and other
cities, in reforming the welfare bureaucracies, expanding the
payrolls as well as breadth of services such as clothing,
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housing, food, etc.
b) To the extent that programs- and resources are avail-
able for attacking social ills, advocacy planning can succeed
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in making these projects more responsive to the needs that
they are addressed to,
c) Advocacy planning has been most successful in stopping
plans and programs that have adverse effects on communities.
None of these outcomes however, entails any considerable re-
distribution of resources. Since funds are limited, a success-
ful attempt on the part of one group to have funds released
to satisfy their needs usually entails disregard for the inter-
ests of another group.
Although advocacy planning operates mostly on the local
level, it can have certain effects on the redistributive
process and the policy decisions at the national level. This
can be achieved by the collective pressure that local projects
exert on the various programs for positive outcomes. One
such strategy to change national priorities starting from
the local level of pressure on the political system has been
outlined by Cloward and Piven. They argue that local attempts
to disrupt city services and strategies to bankrupt the
cities by making exhorbitant demands on them (for what they
are capable of satisfying) would have an effect on the national
policyz
Urban political leaders already
on the brink of fiscal disaster
because they are squeezed between
the services needed by an enlarging
ghetto constituency and the indig-
nation of their white taxpaying
constituents, are becoming insistent
lobbyists r increased federal
subsidies.
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The outcomes of this strategy are difficult to assess.
Certainly cities do lobby for adequate funds. But whatever
redistributions of services and resources occur on the national
level, cannot be attributed directly to advocacy planning.
Other types of pressure are also important, most of all the
public readtion and protest which emerge when objective con-
ditions cannot anymore be coped with or hidden by traditional
programs and practices. A more effective strategy for change
on the national level would be the direct organization,
lobbying and pressure by nationwide interest groups, as is
the case with the National Welfare Rights Organization and
National Tenants Organization.
Second, and most important, pol'itical mechanisms and
government programs are not autonomous from institutional
constraints. The condition of a community is- an objective
condition; it is the result of institutional decisions: it
is determined by the normal reproduction of institutional
decision mechanisms. Only to a very limited extent the
conditions that advocacy planning is confronting are results
of political decisions. And in those cases, it is extremely
successful. The success in opposing plans is due to the fact
that those plans originate from a purposive political process.
But the objective conditions of a class or a community
that advocacy attempts to remedy - such as income inequality,
or urban deterioration - are not results of political decisions.
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They are results of institutional mechanisms, to borrow
Robert Wolff' s terminology, they are events that are not
objects of decision of the political process. The political
process is an appendage to the socioeconomic institutions.
Its decisions are not only restricted by institutional con-
straints but rely on institutional mechanisms to provide the
needed services. Whatever socialized housing exists is a
series of subsidies to financiers and developers. Thus even
if an advocacy planning project is successful in improving
the housing situation in a neighborhood by forcing a local
housing authority to make full use of its funds in supporting
the construction of a 236 project or leased housing units, the
ultimate beneficiary would be the investor who receives a
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return of 25-30% on his investment. In such a situation
government programs, and the political structure of decision-
making does little to alter the objective conditions of the
poor, and, in fact, reinforces the existing institutionalized
mechanisms that produce these inequalities, by guaranteeing
investments and taking the risk out of situations that would
not be profitable otherwise.
Even where the state is responsive to the interests of
the disadvantaged and adopts programs that are directed
to benefit the poor, the functioning of institutionalized
mechanisms often makes these programs inoperable. A most
typical case is that of rent control. ordinances whose short
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term effect might be beneficial to tenants, but in the long
run the function of the market and of the system of incentives
will discourage any further investment in the housing sector
resulting in the deterioration of the housing stock.
Advocacy planning, by accepting this frAmework, becomes
a way of improving the opportunity structure to a pluralist
process which is limited in what it can achieve and is only an
appendage to institutionalized decision-making.
Its interpretation of social justice is commensurate with,
to use Martin Rein's observation: "the American interpretation
of social justice that places its faith in programs designed
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to equalize the opportunity to be unequal."
121
CONCLUSIONS
In the first chapter I proposed that I would investigate
advocacy planning as a professional movement which could
serve as a catalyst for social change and for bringing about
an equitable distribution of resources, a democratic way of
decision-making, and a better quality of environment. I
suggested that my own personal concern was to investigate
ways of achieving those goals. I argued therefore that this
would be a fair basis for the evaluation of advocacy planning
since advocacy planning is a concrete form of a social move-
ment that was also concerned with the above questions, that
was troubled with the existing social inequities and the in-
adequacy of traditional forms of professional practice and of
political mechanisms for dealing with those inequities.
This social movement in its specific form of advocacy plan-
ning adopted the pluralist model of social organization and
of social action. It appealed to the prescriptive value of
the model, as a desirable way of democratically organizing
decisions (chapter one). But also, as I have shown,
sometimes in its theory (Davidoff - chapter three), and
definitely in its practice (chapter four) it proposed the
direct application of the pluralist model as a way of solving
social problems. I have argued (chapter two) that this entails
certain assumptions about the nature of existing decision
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mechanisms and of what it takes to change them. The logic
that the theory acquires as a strategy for social change -
its logic-in-use - is quite different from its logic as a
description of an ideal or a utopian model of social organiz-
ation.
In its logic-in-use, then, advocacy planning assumes
that the existing institutions are potentially pluralistic.
Poverty and social ills are not seen as the results of
institutionalized decision-raking processes and, therefore,
basic in our type of social organization, but as the result
of a malfunctioning political system, a pluralist process in
disequilibrium. The main aspect of this malfunctioning is
the rigidification of government authorities and the neutral
and non-political stance of the planner which renders the
planning process - which is essentially a political process -
incapable of functioning as a way of representing a plurality
of values. I must emplasize again here that this assumption,
although not always explicit in the theory, is essential in
the logic-in-use, the practice of advocacy planning. The
system of delivery of goods and services is seen as slack and
open to the pressure of interest groups. What the poor need
is not a basic redistribution of resources but political re-
sources and particularly technical skills and information to
be able to adequately compete in the political and planning
process.
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Thus, advocacy planning is concerned with improving the
opportunity of the poor to participate in the planning process
and to exploit the available opportunities and resources.
Further, I hace argued that the pluralist assumptions that
are manifested in the practice of advocacy impose severe limit-
ations on its outcomes. The successes of advocacy projects
are usually limited to the opposition of plans that are harm-
ful to the interests of the community. Cases where communities
have gone beyond the phase of opposition and have successfully
implemented their plans, are very few. Available resources
are limited and community groups must compete against each
other for them. The dimension of successful outcomes is
insignificant compared to the magnitude of the task. The
existing opportunity structure is inadequate and, however well
exploited, cannot provide for the needs of the advocate's
clients. This opportunity structure can be widened only thr-
ough a national redistribution of income, a policy which would
conflict with the institutionalized decision mechanisms - the
market, private ownership of resources, etcetera.
Advocate planners have attempted to deal with those limit-
ations operationally, by exploring and evaluating alternative
styles of practice. Alternative models of practice can be more
or less effective in bringing about the outcomes in which ad-
vocacy has been successful, but they cannot alter the limits
of those outcomes as long as pluralist assumptions prevail in
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the practice. In fact, as I have argued, by diverting the
attention of the poor away from basic social injustices and
directing it to the technical articulation of their interests
and participation in the planning process, action that could
lead to fundamental social change is avoided.
By its choice of issues and client groups and its emphasis
on technical resources the logic-in-use of advocacy planning
is to integrate. its clients into the local political process.
It coopts potentially radical demands that could be based on
the objective condition of the poor as a class rather than on
specific and isolated issues.
Advocacy planning also coopts the professional advocate
planner himself: it directs the dissident professional to
expend his limited energies in a form of practice which gives
him the satisfaction of working directly for the interests of
deprived groups and of being involved in 'positive' action
even though the results may be limited, and the process may
be coopting and therefore detrimental to those interests.
Nonetheless, the practice of advocacy, limited as it is,
has performed several positive functions, some of which I have
already identified and are summarized below#
a. Advocacy planning can be effective in reforming bureau-
cracies such as social welfare agencies and city planning
authorities, thus making them more responsive to local needs,
exploiting available resources, and releasing funds (e.g.
welfare checks, 236 housing, etc.) that were previously
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withheld from the users,
b. It can successfully oppose plans such as new highways and
Urban Renewal projects, that are detrimental to the interests
of low income communities,
C. It can bring about certain changes on the national scale
by exerting pressure, and expressing demands on a local level.
d. It has reformed the professions of architecture and plan-
ning by demythologizing the value neutrality of the plan and
of technical skills, thus making the profession accountable
to a previously ignored set of actors and to alternative
values and. goals.
e. It has provided us with an insight and valuable experience
on the dynamics and the issues involved with a democratic
organization of the planning process. the various advocacy
planning projects provide us with models of how decisions could
be taken collectively, and technical knowledge disseminated
and questioned, in an ideal situation where matters of major
social importance would be objects of our decision,
f. Finally, advocacy planning has had an unintended positive
result. In its incapacity to implement any of its own commun-
ity-plans, in spite of the very large amount of expended res-
ources - time, skills, vocal protest, contacts, on the part of
both the community and the planner, it serves as an excellent
illustration of the inadequacies of existing programs. In
assuming that services can be delivered without major structural
reforms in the distribution of power and the relations of
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production - the institutionalized decision mechanisms -
advocacy planning has pushed and exploited the existing state
and federal programs, and the judicial apparatus to their
limits, thus exposing their inadequacies.
Alternatives
I have argued throughout this paper that political mech-
anisms of decision-making are inadequate for solving social
problems. This is not because they lack adequate resources
but because they are constrained by institutionalized mechan-
isms of decision-making. Insufficient resources -to deal with
urgent social problems is just a manifestation of the true
function of politics. Resources are abundant when political
mechanisms are used as an instrument of powerful interests.
The criticism of advocacy planning was based on the ass-
umption, that I attempted to justify, that political institut-
ions are not autonomous; but rather they are an appendage and
a corrective mechanism to the economic institutions which decide
most of the questions of major social importance.
The task, then, is to free politics from those constraints:
to change and expand the role of political decisions and to
bring the matters that are of major social importance under
the control of purposive social action, of planning.
The emancipation of politics cannot happen by itself.
Advocacy planning will be useful only if it helps in this process
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of transf ormation. It must overcome the pluralist assumptions
on the autonomy of politics. It must understand the limitat-
ions of politics imposed by the institutionalized constraints,
and must manifest this understanding in its practice.
This is a particularly difficult task since, as I have
argued, citizens perceive the institutionalized constraints
as natural or given and hence they accept them and act ration-
ally within them, by dealing with their objective conditions
individually rather than collectively, except in situations
where the inequalities produced by those institutions are so
blatant that they become explosive.
Advocacy planning must develop an analysis, alternative
to that of pluralism, that can adequately explain the nature
of decision mechanisms, their consequences and what is needed
to change them. Chester Hartman recommends that:
Advocate planners should have a clear polit-
ical analysis of the way the system works as
a whole and the way in which individual Plem-
ents of the system relevant to their field
operate: the housing ms.rket, urban renewal,
the highway program, etc....
If the advocate planner's understanding
of the situation leads him to analyze the
system as a whole, it is his responsibility
to framehis findings in broader systematic
terms and to attempt to persuade the comm-
unity that this analysis is correct. The
action implications are, of course, quite
different, depending on the analysis.
That analysis should lead to a consistent
program of action.1
Such an analysis will require a different strategy from
that of pluralistic advocacy planning and will be reflected
in a new practice, from the selection of issues and constituencies
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to the use of resources and technical skills. I shall examine
some of the issues involved with this new practice below.
A pluralist advocate planner would reject a point of
view that emphasizes the political analysis, even though his
own view necessarily implies an analysis. Marshall Kaplan,
for example, states thait
The value system assumed by the planner
need only be a basic humanism, a humanism
concerned with expanding the choices of
the poor as a priority imperative. Values
or commitment should not be confused with
ideology. Too often those with ideologies,
whether of the ri ht or left, use the poor
rather than are used by the poor. Given
the complex problems facing the poor, plans
premised on ideologies are, at best,
irrelevant and, at worst, harmful to the
specific interests of the poor for they
represent unreal, often misplaced, abst-
ractions. As such they provide a weak
base upon which to engage in the resource
allocation process. Finally, the planning
process engaged in by the ideologue must
be, because of the nature of ideology, a
deductive one, whereas complex ghetto
problems require an inductive approach.2
Kaplan calls for a practice of advocacy that corresponds
to the pluralistic model that I criticized earlier. He fails
to recognize that his own position is ideological, that to
follow that practice one must necessarily accept the pluralist
assumptions on the nature of our insItutions, and the limits
of the possible outcomes of his actions.
As for the value system of 'a basic humanism", noone would
deny that they adhere to it. It is too general and emotive
a phrase to serve as an adequate. basis for action, and it has
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teen used in the past to justify widely disparate modes of
action.
Kaplan's aversion for what he calls ideology, i.e. a
political analysis that leads to a consistent program of
action, points to a real problem: engaging in pluralistic
advovacy planning, in the manner, for example, suggested by
Kaplan, is either to identify problems of specific communities -
clients - that are manifested in a concrete form, (e.g. the
threat of an Urban Renewal Pl&n) or it is to translate the
general and objective condition of a community into a series
of concrete and rational demands that can be technically argued,
and addressed to, and mediated in the existing and visible
resource allocation-political process. The limitations of
this process were explained above. Such a practice has the
advantage of being rational, as opposed to utopian, in the
sense of identifying problems in a way that they have a chance
of being satisfie in the limited available opportunity struct-
ure. An approach that wants to overcome the limits of this
pluralistic mode of action and attempts not only to mediate
demands in the existing opportunity structure, but to expand
that structure itself, is faced with the danger of seeming
utopian - even though our society has the potential and the
productive capacity to make it possible, once the institution-
alized constraints are lifted.
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A strategy, then, that confronts the task of changing the
mechanisms of decision is faced with the danger of neglecting
the specific issues arid the concrete problems of the poor,
fearing that their position will be coopted 'and thus favoring
a grandiose scheme for social change that postpones grati
fication until "after the revolution". It is this type of
strategy that alarms Kaplan.
A movement that wants to overcome pluralism and to be
successful in organizing and politicizing, must also over-
come utopianism; it must show how what is not possible now
is not a natural state of affairs and can become possible in
the future.
To develop strong community organization there is a need
to produce concrete results. Otherwise, as Kaplan says,
the analysis will remain "an empty abstraction". Community
problems cannot be neglected for the sake of a long range
strategy. Further, the concrete benefits that accrue to the
poor from a successful strategy give credence to the viability
of this strategy. This is something that pluralistic advocacy
planning has obviously failed to achieve.
An alternative strategy, then, is faced with the dilemma of
having to make a tradeoff between long range and short range
goals. Using the limited resources to pursue only the former
is dangerously utopian. Pursuing only the latter can lead to
limited reforms only.
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Can this dilemma be resolved in the practice of advocacy
planning?
The task, in terms of the issues that advocacy planning
is confronting, is to deal with issues that are not the
results of political decisions (such as highway proposals
and urban renewal plans), but also with issues that are
results of institutionalized mechanisms - with objective
conditions - and to try to challenge those mechanisms. Such
issues cut across individual and isolated communities. The
client, then, ofadvocacy would shift, from a particular
public, to the public, the members of a social class,
Alliances among different communities would be sought and
demands could be presented on the national level. In such
a case, technical skills would be used, not to restrict
and to coopt demands, but to find new .ways of presenting
them, challenging the existing opportunity structure by
showing the limitations ofwhat can be achieved within it.
The most lucid example of this type of practice will
be found in advocacy projects opposing highway plans.
In the Inner Belt and the South-West Expressway contro-
versy, in Cambridge and Boston, the advocates moved away
from the specific issue of the adverse effect of the
location of the highways on the local communities and,
without neglecting it, they challenged the whole process
of decision-making on transportation. They claimed that
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political decisions - public expenditure on highways -
were favoring the interests of commuters, the car and oil
industry, and the builders. They challenged the instituti-
onalized constraint of resolving the transportation
problem through individual consumption - cars and highways
- in favor of a collective model - mass transit - that has
redistributive implications.
"Who was now the advocate's client?", asks Lisa Peattie:
(The advocate) was speaking for people...
unaware of themselves as constituting an
interest group, and unaggregated in any
particular social unit orinstitution...he
was speaking for institutional restruct-
uring, and its apposite model now
appeared not so much that of the lawyer
defending an indigent client as that of
the radical political action group.
The task of restructuring institutions is not easy.
But a first step for the advocate planner is to reject
the pluralist assumptions that limit the scope of his
practice.
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APPENDIX
The discussion of advocacy projects is based on know-
ledge through readings (see bibliography) and discussions of
various projects in the area and elsewhere, as well as on
personal experience.
In the last four years I have worked in four community
projects in a role that could be described as an advocate
planner. One of them involved the opposition to a civic
center in the Roxbury section of Boston consisting of a
court house, a police station and a library.
In this case, my own position was to try to persuade
the client group that more could be achieved by opposing the
whole proposed complex - including the police station and the
court house, and that the concerned group's role should be to
mobilize the community around the issue, The community,
though, took a moderate stand. They decided to accept the
court house and the police station and to advocate the ex-
pansion of the program for the library to encompass many
functions related to community needs. The plans that I pro-
duced were instrumental in persuading the city that an ex-
panded program was possible on the site. The city accepted
the modified program in exchange for ensuring the implement-
ation of the court house and the police station. Two years
after my involvement with the group had ended - successfully,
for what their objectives were, and what they were expecting
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from me - I received a call from the Black Fanther Party
expressing indignation at the fact that a conspicuous police
station was built in the heart of the black district, and
asking for details of the situation. Construction work on
the court house and the police station has since been completed,
but it has not begun on the library.
A second project involved'the rehabilitation through
community resources, abandoned or BRA-owned housing in
Bosont's South End, as part of CAUSE's program for community
organization and community development.
A third project is a classic case of urban renewal
conflict in Lynn, Massachusetts. The Urban Renewal Program
of Lynn had dislocated the larger part of 4,500 working Icass
large-sized families and had flattened a large area in the
center of Lynn. The place, of the single family houses that
were demolished, was to be taken by milti-family predominantly
one and two bedroom high rise apartment houses. The objectives
of the plan were to provide the residential basis of the diver-
sification of the General Electric plant facilities - General
Electric is the major employer in the area - to convert the
urban renewal area into a middle class sleeping suburb for
the Boston Metropolitan area, and to upgrade the property of
powerful real estate interests through the use of federal
funds. No adequate housing for the displaced large families
exists in the area and the city had not submitted any relocation
plans - required by law - although it had received, a large part
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of the federal government matching funds. The City Hall and
the local newspaper were totally indifferent to the interests
and demands of the community. The Citizens for a Better Lynn
and other community organizations - although they took an
active role after much of the demolition was completed -
successfully blocked implementation of the plan through court
action asking for a referendum on the bond issue. The advocate
planners provided information showing how the land disposition
documents did not adequately cover the housing needs of the
large families in the neighborhood. In the last elections the
mayor and many of the members of the city council were voted
out of office.
Finally, in 1970-71, I was involved in a project in
Holyoke, Massachusetts. In the previous year a group of
students and faculty from Harvard (Urban Field Service) and
MIT was contacted by a community group on a matter the comm-
unity was urgently, directly and adversely affected by. The
Master Plan for the City of Holyoke which had just been com-
pleted, had designated the South City area (Ward II) composed
largely of working class French Canadian Americans, as an
industrial park forbidding any further investment in the
residential life of the community.
The Harvard-MIT group produced a report - a result of
a detailed study of the community - which argued against the
Master Plan recommendations for South City. The team found
the community to be stable, to have a beneficial relationship
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with the surrounding industry and argued that the Master Plan
recommendations virtually condemned to decay a residential
community of 60 densely built acres, by blocking any invest-
ment in the residential use of the area and opening the way
for the Urban Renewal bulldozer. The report called for a
variance of the Miaster Plan.
The residents, immediately threatened by the Master Plan,
gathered all the political power at their disposal, and with
the MIT-Harvard report at hand, they got the Holyoke City
Council to revise its 1968 Master Plan by deleting from it
all references to the proposed reorganization of their ward
for purely industrial purposes.
Our group was then asked to develop plans for the rehab-
ilitation of the neighborhood. We worked closely with the
leaders of the local storefront organization which was our
contact with the community and which we helped incorporate,
opening the membership to the entire community. But this local
corporation was democratic and open only in its structure
since the larger community failed to participate. The only
active participants were the local politicians, aldermen
and established leaders of the neighborhood: people who re-
ceived personal gratification from participating. So, beyond
the plan that we produced there was no other resource that
could be utilized. In the first phase of the-project, when
MIT helped in making the changes in. the Master Plan, commun-
ity interest and participation was substantial. This interest
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disappeared in the second phase.
In this phase, we identified certain problems of the
community, such as lack of adequate municipal services, in-
sufficient playgrounds and open space facilities, traffic
problems and most importantly deterioration. blight, and
need for overall improvement and rehabilitation. Although
active community participation was absent, we felt that our
identification of problems was adequate and would have met
with approval from the neighborhood. On the basis of this
we developed an idealized plan for the community, of needed
services and of rehabilitation work that needed to be done.
If our work had stopped there the result would have been
a utopian projection without practical value to the community,
No action could be taken on its basis and it would only have..
served as a way to raise the hopes of the clients without the
benefit of informing them of how the goals of that plan could
be pursued and attained and thus frustrating their own desires
and hopes. The next phase therefore was to superimpose on
this idealized plan a new one that translated those goals
into a series of target areas for which we developed detailed
plans and identified the possible sources of funds available
in city, state and federal programs, and courses of action
the community might take to achieve implementation. This
second stage of the project has not been as successful as the
first.
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Se-ieral factors - mistakes and shortcomings on our part
as planners - could account for this-failure. Factors beyond
our control are explained in the main body of this thesis.
- We could be blamed for not actively soliciting comm-
unity participation and support for this stage of the project,
or for not pushing the development plan at the time the comm-
unity was already mobilized (when immediately threatened by
the Master Plan) .
- We could be blamed for our lack of adequate skills
and adequate contacts (the two are practically inseparable
since adequate skills means ability to manipulate available
resources) with both. government grograms and private financiers.
This is definitely a possibility although we did actively
pursue funding possibilities from state programs (MJHFA) with
vague promises as a result. But even if our skills and con-
tacts were more adequate there are few things that we could
have achieved in the Holyoke project: the first would have
been to compete with other communities and put pressure on
various state (MHFA) and federal government programs to con-
tribute from their limited funds in the rehabilitation of
the neighborhood.
The second avenue would have been ro rely on market
mechanisms and persuade private financiers that the condition
of the neighborhood did indeed make it worth their while to
invest in it. Over this second avenue we had no control as
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planners. The conditions of the neighborhood that determine
such things as investment are set by institutional mechan-
isms that the plan cannot control.
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